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ABSTRACT

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

Sagung M. Kertayuda, MA
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Scot Schraufnagel, Director
This thesis examines the factors that influence the effective number of political parties in
five Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Specifically, it will examine the association between the number of political parties as the
dependent variable and the three independent variables, which are the electoral system; the
social, religious and ethnic cleavages; and the role of patron-client relationships. This research is
an attempt to provide a cross-sectional study of Southeast Asian political parties with an aim to
uncover an explanation for the variance in the number of political parties found in the region.
Specifically, the goal is to explain which combination of the different variables will have the
greatest influence on the effective number of political parties in each country with an eye toward
determining if there are any generalizable explanations. This study concludes that electoral laws
are the deciding factor for the number of political parties in the case for Malaysia and Singapore.
In the cases for Thailand and the Philippines, this study concludes that there are further variables
outside the scope of the three variables studied that can possibly contribute to the outcome of
political parties. In the study of Indonesia, this study concludes that all three variables
contributed to the multi-party outcome.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

A common debate in the field of political science concerns the question of, “what
determines the number of competitive political parties within a polity.” The question is answered
by emphasizing two main points. First, it is widely recognized that electoral laws structure
coalitional incentives (Golder 2005; Lipset 1959; Neto & Cox 1997; Norris 1997). Second, the
importance of pre-existing social cleavages that are understood to influence the effective number
of political parties (Aldrich 1995; Mainwaring 2001; Manza 1999; Zielinski 2002). This research
concerning the democracies of Southeast Asia will examine both of these explanations but also
look to isolate the effect of patron-client networks on political parties (Buehler & Tan 2007;
Gomez 2002; Kang 2002; Mietzner 2007; Pye 1997). My thesis will determine the independent
variables which have the greatest influence on the effective number of political parties in the five
Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
More specifically, this research will examine the association between the number of
political parties and the electoral system, the number of social, religious and ethnic cleavages,
and the role of patron-client networks. The research is an attempt to provide a cross-sectional
study of Southeast Asian political parties in order to uncover an explanation for the variance in
the number of political parties found in the region. The aim is to test which combination of the
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different variables will have the greatest influence on the number of effective political parties in
each country with an eye toward determining if there are any generalizable results. The study
concluded that the variables do influence the number of effective political parties, and each
country exhibited different outcomes of the party system depending on which variable played a
dominant influential role. Electoral laws as the independent variable was pivotal in the
development of the dominant single political party system found in Malaysia and Singapore. The
existence of patron-client networks and corrupt practices affected the outcome of political parties
found in the Philippines and in Thailand. Indonesia exhibited all three variables as potential
factors on the outcome of the political party system.
Most previous studies on electoral and party systems use Western European countries for
analysis, and the inclusion of Southeast Asian cases represents an important comparative
contribution to the existing literature. Additionally, many Southeast Asian countries are starting
to consolidate their democracies or uphold democratic practices from previously authoritarian
regimes such as in Indonesia and the Philippines. This research should be considered particularly
relevant for the understanding of party system formation in new democracies.
Electoral systems and political parties are important and central to representative
government because their existence allows citizens to choose between competing candidates
during elections. This process will eventually lead to the selection of a winning party or
candidate that will represent its citizens in the government and give a political voice to the
people. As noted, the rules and policies of electoral systems influence the nature and behavior of
a political party. Political parties serve as a vehicle to promote different interests, platforms, and
ideologies. For example, a nationalistic or religious party may endorse a point view or agenda of
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a certain demographic within a country. The involvement or support of a political party by an
individual showcases the degree to which political parties are essential tools because they give
citizens a voice in the government.
Political parties are acknowledged as an essential component of representative
democracy. Modern states today use political parties as a platform for organizing voters,
representing specific interests of the constituents, representing political campaigns, and
providing a platform for electoral and legislative activity. Not only are active political parties a
component of representative democracy, but are also instrumental to the process of democratic
development in emerging democracies (Aldrich 1995; Haggard and Low 2002; Lipset & Rokkan
1967; Mair 1997; Satori 1976). Political parties can be viewed as a primary source for building
accountable and responsive government as they ideally represent political constituencies,
interests, and ideologies. They recruit new candidates for office, influence policy-making
agendas, and integrate various groups and individuals into the democratic process. Political
parties make collective action possible within the legislature as coalitions emerge to stand behind
a certain political platform, policy, or ideology. Additionally, political parties provide a link
between the citizens and their government, becoming a source for holding government
accountable for its actions and performance.
Within consolidated or emerging democracies, political parties play a central role which
is now widely accepted by both policy makers and scholars. Policymakers and organizations
favor cohesive and organizationally developed political parties. According to the US National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Political parties form the cornerstone of a
democratic society and represent social interests and provide a structure for political participation
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and civil activity. They train political leaders who will assume a role in governing society. In
addition, parties contest and win elections to seek a measure of control of government
institutions.’’1 Political parties permit political participation. Among scholars, political parties
are similarly acknowledged as an essential element of representative democracy and many argue
that strong political parties are the center of modern democracy and strong developed institutions
(Huntington 1968). Leading scholars of democracy, such as Juan Linz (1998), Larry Diamond
(2003) and Seymour Martin Lipset & Rokkan (1967), have stated that effective democratic
governance needs effective parties and that political parties are indispensable for both
transitional and established democracies.
Both policymakers and scholars agree that the qualities of stable and established political
parties are important for emerging and consolidated democracies, but they offer surprisingly
little advice as to how such party systems are developed and implemented. Scholars have viewed
political parties as a social phenomenon instead of a deliberate plan of institutional design. In
theory, political parties represent the political expression of underlying societal cleavages and
have not been regarded as a creation of political engineering (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Some
authoritarian states have attempted to control the development of political parties and the party
system, for example, the military rule in Indonesia during Suharto’s New Order regime. But
most Western democracies allow parties to develop freely.
Yet in many countries, considered emerging democracies, political parties are struggling
to gain a foothold in and consequently are unable to play a beneficial role for the government or

1

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, ‘‘Political Party Development,”
hhttp://www.ndi.org/globalp/polparties/polparties.aspi (accessed 27 March 2008).
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its citizens. For instance, in some emerging democracies, the political parties are poorly
institutionalized and are too weak to garner support. They may fail to represent society as a
whole or fail to stand for a particular policy agenda or ideological platform. The political parties
become a vehicle for corruption instead of representative democracy.
Within Southeast Asia, there are emerging democracies that are experiencing the growth
of political parties and their role in representative government is evolving. In comparative studies
of political parties, it has become a conventional discussion that this region is less strongly
institutionalized than their Western counterparts. It can be argued that Southeast Asian political
parties are seen as highly dependent on their political leaders and lack programmatic
organization (Dalton, Shin, & Chu 2008; Hicken 2007). Scholars argue that the weakness of
political parties have created poorly developed party systems, especially in Thailand and the
Philippines, which are classified by some as “non-party” systems (Kim 2003). Scholars have
generalized about the nature of political parties in Southeast Asia using three main explanations.
The first explanation focuses on regional culture and scholars note that culture makes Southeast
Asian political parties more susceptible to patron-client networks and paternalistic forms of
government (Dalton 1996; Flanagan and Lee 2000; Kim 2003). Second, unlike the West, classbased parties are not well established in this region because the majority of Southeast Asian
countries were recently under authoritarian regimes, such as Indonesia and the Philippines.
Southeast Asian countries were not able to experience the rise of labor unions that would have
transformed class-based political parties, similar to the Western experience (Bell 1973). Third,
scholars have argued that Southeast Asian political parties are usually formed to facilitate
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support for a new political leader and become personal tool of this leader rather than representing
the society and strong institutions (Dalton, Shin, & Chu 2008).
However, these three generalizations explaining the development of political parties in
Southeast Asia do not fully explain the variation in the number of political parties and the nature
of party systems that have been established in the region. The Southeast Asian region is highly
diverse and generalizations are often based on single nation case-studies. This thesis will attempt
to rectify this situation by conducting a comparative analysis of five Southeast Asian countries.
Descriptive data on the electoral systems of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and
Singapore will be collected and compared. In addition, a quantitative approach will be used by
calculating the precise ‘effective number of political parties’ (Laakso & Taagepera 1979) that
exist in each country. These values will become the primary dependent variable in the analysis
that follows. Specifically, the dependent variable will be measured based on the following
formula (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979):

Once the effective number of political parties have been calculated, the electoral laws, societal
cleavages, and patron-client networks will be examined as the independent variables that may
influence the effective number of political parties.
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The value of the independent variables: the role of the electoral system; the role of social,
ethnic, and religious cleavages; and the role of patron-client networks in influencing the number
of political parties will be determined by previous literature and studies. More specifically, the
role of the electoral system and its influence on political parties will be determined by examining
the electoral rules and the district magnitude in each of the Southeast Asian countries. The
independent variable for social cleavages will be determined using previous literature and an
analysis of the demographic composition of each of the five Southeast Asian countries. The role
of patron-client networks will be measured through scholarly understanding of clientelistic
parties and the frequency of voting-buying in each country. This study aims to combine both a
qualitative cross-sectional and quantitative methodology to yield results that will determine what
factors influence the number of political parties in each county.
For the purpose of this study, the five Southeast Asian countries are chosen because of
their ‘democratic’ systems or by the presence of democratic institutions and practices. Two nongovernmental organizations known for defining democracy, the Freedom House and Polity IV,
were consulted to select the countries in this study. Compared to the other Southeast Asian
countries, such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Laos, the five selected countries for this
research have active electoral systems and conduct relatively open national and local elections.
Based on the results of the 2014 Polity IV data, Timor-Leste is considered to be relatively
democratic and on the path to consolidating democracy. However, for the purpose of this study,
Timor-Leste will not be examined due to recently becoming internationally recognized as
independent from Indonesia in 2002. The recent political developments in Timor-Leste will not
be sufficient because of the limited number of national elections that have been conducted in
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comparison to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. Timor-Leste has
conducted only three national elections.
This study will focus on the national legislative elections for the “House of
Representatives” or Lower House within each country. The decision to restrict the data to
national legislative elections is because the countries included vary between a unicameral and
bicameral structure; and a House of Representatives chamber is present in all countries.
Information on national legislative elections in each country will be collected mainly through
each individual country’s election commission. It will be acknowledged that sometimes the
election results that are posted may not be the reality of the results because the numbers might be
tampered with or changed. However, it has been decided that the election results from a given
source will be taken at face-value because there are limited alternatives to the official counts.
Southeast Asian elections from the mid-1990s until the present represent the timeline for this
study. Prior to 1998, Indonesia was governed by an authoritarian administration and therefore in
order to be consistent when making comparisons; the timeline will be set from the mid-1990s to
the present.
Transparency International scores on a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to one hundred
(very clean). The country’s rank is based on the perception for the public sector and also
indicates the country’s position in comparison to other countries. In addition to the Corruption
Perception Index, the Global Corruption Barometer is another index that presents the public
opinion and the general public’s views on corruption based on surveys and questionnaires. The
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survey evaluates and measures the general public’s views on government efforts to eradicate
corruption and their perception of corruption in their country.
As stated previously, this research focuses on uncovering what independent variables
influence the number of political parties in each country and consequently will act as an
extension of the current literature on the development of political parties in Southeast Asia. With
a few significant exceptions, there is an overall lack of literature on Southeast Asia political
parties and elections. Scholars of Southeast Asian studies have contributed to advancing the
knowledge in the area of nationalism, state-building, state-society relations, and the development
of political economy. Most of the research on Southeast Asia is descriptions of individual
countries, single elections, or single parties. The following section highlights areas where the
works of Southeast Asian scholars bring a comparative and theoretical approach to the study of
parties and elections.
Since the fall of the communism in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the emergence of
the Third Wave of democracy, a term coined by Samuel Huntington (1991), has allowed political
scientists to examine and observe the effects of different electoral systems on emerging political
parties and the overall effect on democratization. In Pippa Norris’s (1997) study of electoral
systems, she concluded that political parties generally tend to favor situations that will benefit
them. She claims that excluded political parties are not able to change the electoral laws that
mainly favor dominant parties.
The scholarly literature on electoral systems and political parties is vast, studies on the
electoral system and political parties encompass both non-comparative and comparative
perspectives. Discussing all the available scholarly literature on electoral systems and political
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parties would have been a daunting task. Instead, for the purpose of this study, the major works
on Western and Southeast Asian electoral systems and political parties will be discussed.
Focusing on a handful of key works by scholars studying both Western or Southeast Asian
electoral systems and political parties will be appropriate for this paper, because the objective of
the literature review is to showcase that there is a lack of literature on Southeast Asian electoral
system and political parties. Moreover, by discussing both Western and Southeast Asian electoral
systems and political parties, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the external
validity of previous scholarly works. The following sections of literature review will be
separated into two parts: 1) the existing literature on Western electoral and political party
systems and 2) the existing literature on Southeast Asian political parties. Each section of the
literature review will include following sub-sections that discuss previous works of each of the
independent variables and each variable’s role on the development of political parties.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Existing Literature Review on Western Political Parties

Conventional discussions and arguments on the importance of electoral systems have
acknowledged that some electoral systems encourage or enforce the formation of political parties
or individual candidates. The type of party system, such as the particular number or relative size
of political parties in the legislature, which develops within a state, can be attributed to the
electoral system—some electoral systems encourage the formation of political parties, while
other electoral systems emphasize the role of individual candidates. Electoral systems can also
influence the nature of political parties, such as the process of campaigning, the formation of
coalitions and alliance, or the formation of national, ethnic, or religious based parties. In the
study of electoral systems, the choice between a Proportional Representation (PR) system and a
single-member district election through plurality such as a First-Past-the-Post system (FPTP),
will lead to institutional variation and different outcomes of political party formations. For
example, PR systems will garner voters to vote for political parties instead of individual
candidates during elections, allocating a particular party to ensure an x number of seats within
the legislature—a PR system allows political parties to obtain a degree of political representation
within the government. Whereas an electoral system based on electoral laws on majority or
plurality voting within a single-member district will cause voters in a given electoral district to
vote for a specific individual candidate. An advantage of this system allows voters to have a
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greater clarity of representation because voters will know that the winning candidate is directly
responsible for their interests and district. However, the disadvantage of this system is that it
does not guarantee any electoral or political representation for minority interests or groups. A
party, group, or interest that has a slight minority could easily lose in elections within each
electoral district—eventually leading to no political or electoral representation (Farrell 2001;
Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005).
These two systems will be discussed again when we examine the case studies of
Indonesia and Malaysia, whose electoral systems are categorized as PR and FPTP respectively—
two electoral systems that lead to two different political party formations. Electoral studies
typically examine the results of varying electoral laws and systems on the outcomes of political
parties and attempts to clarify the relationship between these two variables (Laakso & Taagepera
1979). Claimed by Duverger (1986) from a previous study, a plurality rule favors the outcome of
a two-party system; whereas, a proportional system facilitates an outcome of multiparty within a
polity. With Duverger’s (1986) study, it raises a methodological question of how to count big or
small political parties. Lijphart’s (1994) study reexamined this methodological question by
comparing twenty-seven case-studies of industrialized democracies from 1945-1990 by using the
‘effective number of parliamentary parties’ (ENPP) equation based on the study from Laakso
and Taagepera (1979). The measurement of ENPP takes into consideration the number of
political parties and its relative size. Lijphart (1995) found that the ENPP vary in different
electoral systems. For example, in a plurality system the ENPP is 2.0, and in a majority system
the ENPP is 2.8. Whereas in proportional systems, the ENPP is 3.6. Lijphart concludes that
within proportional systems the minimum threshold of votes will also have an effect on the
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inclusion of minor parties. With previous studies from Lijphart (1995) and Laakso and
Taagepera (1979), this study contributes to the discussion of the impact of electoral systems from
a comparative perspective by examining polities in Southeast Asia. Although Lijphart examines
twenty-seven countries (1995), and eventually expanded the case-studies to thirty-six (1999), the
countries that were examined did not involve any Southeast Asian country. A reason for
exclusion might be due to the fact that some of the Southeast Asian countries, i.e. Indonesia and
the Philippines, were still under authoritarian regimes during the time of Lijphart’s study. Studies
from Lijphart (1995) and Norris (1997) support the discussion that electoral systems vary, and
depending on the particular system, will influence democratization. A study from Hoffman
(2005) supports Lijphart’s claims that different electoral systems, particularly proportional
electoral systems, are more likely to encourage democratization compared to other electoral
systems.
Corruption and vote buying is a pervasive phenomenon in many developing democracies.
Finan and Schechter (2012) claim that vote buying operates through a reciprocity channel. While
there is some debate about the negative or positive consequences of the buying and selling of
votes, there is a consensus that electoral politics brings with it a host of costs. Vote buying and
other forms of patron-client relationships can weaken or even reverse the standard accountability
relationship that is central to democracy (Karlan 1994; Kitschelt 2000; Hicken 2011; Stokes
2004). Vote buying also obstructs the development of and trust in the political institutions from
the public and challenges democratic development and consolidation (Auyero 2000; Calvo &
Murillo 2004; Chubb 1982). Finally, vote buying and other forms of patron-client relationships
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are associated with public-sector inefficiencies and weak institutions (Hicken 2007; Keefer 2005;
Keefer 2007) and higher levels of corruption (Keefer 2007; Kitschelt 2000).

Existing Literature Review on Southeast Asian Political Parties

An assessment of electoral systems in Southeast Asia is important because many of the
countries in that particular region have just experienced the beginning of democratic practices or
on a path of consolidated democracy—electoral transitions that would be interesting to examine
and observe. The vast existing scholarly literature on Southeast Asian elections and electoral
systems are largely descriptive studies on electoral systems and case-studies (Carlos & Banlaoi,
1996; Rachagan 1980).
Earlier studies of Southeast Asian countries can be considered as brush-clearing
contributions laying down a foundation of the historical and political background of the region.
These studies were necessary and useful in a developing region like Southeast Asia, where
language, logistical data collection, and bureaucratic challenges can make it problematic for
scholars to gain access to information on parties and elections. Previous brush-clearing studies
like national election results from the region (Nohlen 2001; et al.), a historical review of the
electoral systems (Hicken 2004; Hicken & Kasuya 2000), a description of the party systems
(Sachsenroder & Frings 1998), or a catalogue of Filipino political parties (Carlos & Banlaoi
1996) are invaluable resources for scholars to understand elections and parties in the region.
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The existing literature on the region contains a large number of studies identifying or
analyzing the electoral rules and results of a single country (Carlos & Banlaoi 1996; Rachagan
1980). Although these studies are highly descriptive in nature and serve as a foundation for
further research, they do not provide theoretically informed studies. A combination of descriptive
and empirical data within a theoretical and comparative context will lead to an accumulation of
knowledge about Southeast Asian parties and elections. Through the years, Southeast Asian
scholars have begun to apply empirical data in their studies in order to create discussion about
theoretical concerns and expand the existing theoretical framework. A prime example of works
applying empirical data within the context of the electoral system can be found in Feith’s (1957)
and King’s (2003) case study of Indonesia.
Dwight King’s book (2003) discusses the possibility of consolidating democracy in
Indonesia as the study focus on the analysis of the 1999 Indonesian elections through the
comparison of voting patterns across the 1955 and 1990 elections. Using the empirical data from
the elections, King tests the hypothesis of voting loyalties and applies the existing theoretically
discussion of social and geographic cleavages on voting behavior in Indonesia. King concludes
in his findings that the 1999 and 1955 elections produced the religious, class, and regional voting
behavior. This single country case study contributed to the discussion of theoretical concerns of
social cleavages on the voting behavior in Indonesia, and it set the platform for other scholars to
begin critique and continue further research.
For example, King’s argument supporting the enduring social cleavage patterns on voting
behavior has been challenged by Liddle (1970). They challenge both the methodological and
empirical context of King’s study and claim that sociological variables are inadequate and weak
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predictors of voting behavior and does not explain the election results. Instead, Liddle (1970)
provide an alternative variable that a voter’s attachment to a local or national political leader will
affect the voting behavior. The emerging debate about the variables that would explain the
voting behavior and the results of an election in Indonesia contribute to the literature on
Southeast Asia both theoretically and empirically. This voting behavior is not the only trend
observed in the increasing literature on Southeast Asia.
As the literature in Southeast Asia continue to expand, there is a developing interest on
the role of money in politics and elections. Studies such as Anek and Pasuk and Baker discusses
the growing influence of business interests on elections in Thailand (Anek 1992; Pasuk & Baker
1995). Whereas Anusorn, de Castro, and Sidel describe the potentially vital role money plays in
driving the election campaigns in Thailand and the Philippines (Anusorn 1995; de Castro 1992;
Sidel 1996). Similar studies in Malaysia have analyzed the role of business interests and its
financial support of the Malaysian political party United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
during elections (Gomez & Jomo 1997). These single-country case studies have the potential to
be a cross-sectional study across multiple Southeast Asian countries. The similarities between
the literature on the provincial elite and the role of money in politics found in the Philippines,
Thailand, and Malaysia has created a theoretical framework of interest for Southeast Asian
scholars.
The literature of money politics and corruption in Southeast Asia is also fairly recent and
continues to be a dynamic subject in the theoretical framework. While these studies were
primarily focused on Southeast Asia, the ideas these studies provide contributed in other
comparative contexts. Previous studies examined the relationship of money politics and

17

corruption on an individual level between the political candidate and the voter and not so much
on the broader level of political parties. Further research of the role of money politics and
corruption in political parties can possibly account for the voting pattern during elections and the
development and variance of political parties found in Southeast Asia.
Several scholars describe money politics as predatory power by using several case studies
(Choi 2004). Other scholars also address the topic of money politics by arguing that the increase
of potential political power and resources within a decentralized polity will create opportunities
of financial reward from the perspective of local officials (Choi 2004). Other scholars, such as
McCarthy (2007), bring attention to the possibility that money politics does not only impact
national elections, but also argue that money politics is also widespread and prevalent in
elections within local legislatures. Scholars of Southeast Asian research have also referred to
money politics in terms of a corrupting influence on democracy (McVey 2000).
The term money politics has no standardized or defined meaning, and in most cases, the
term describes a broad range of practices and behavior such as political corruption, vote buying,
and clientelism. In an effort to provide clarity and consistency with the literature review and
research, money politics will be considered as vote buying, vote brokers, and political
corruption. The term vote buying can be described as an exchange of goods, services, or cash for
the promise or agreement to vote in a particular manner during an election. Some scholars such
as Schaffer and Schedler (2007) examine vote buying as a market exchange. While other
scholars such as Hicken (2007) would argue that there is a cultural and institutional component
to vote buying , suggesting that a number of factors such as culture (clientism and patron-client
relationships), income, electoral rules, and other conditions should be taken into consideration.
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Arguments against vote buying explain that this political strategy is not always effective because
voters attach meanings to the transactions between voting and services, goods, or cash
received—who makes an office is just as important as how much they are offering (Thongchai
2008).
In Thailand, scholars have examined the relationship between politicians and huakhanaen
(vote brokers), individuals that are employed to deliver votes to their particular political officials
(Anyarat 2007). These vote brokers are found to be very influential and essential to Thai
politicians because the vote brokers are the ones getting out into the villages and ensuring victory
for the candidate through means of persuading the constituencies. Theses huakhanaen vote
brokers in Thailand persuade constituencies by interactions ranging from publicizing the political
candidate’s platform, to vote buying, and even to threats and violence against the constituencies
(Callahan & McCargo 1996).
As voting-buying and vote brokers play a role in the election, or reelection, of a political
candidate, it is logical to assume that the political costs for vote buying and vote brokers require
a substantial amount of funds by the political candidate. The conventional definition of
corruption relies on the concept that corruption acts as an incentive for using tactics, such as vote
buying, to gain political office, or put in a different way, the use of public resources for private
gain. A political official might exploit and embezzle public funds to fund the campaign,
employing vote brokers and allowing vote buying in order to ensure the political official’s
victory. In this scenario, we can observe the argument that corruption leads to vote buying
(Bowie 2008). For example, Bowie (2008) concludes that vote buying in Thailand became a
major factor in elections due to the exploitation of government budgets. Within the case of
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Indonesia, the increase of economic development benefited the state as government funds and
budget also increased, allowing many greedy political officials to exploit the states’ public funds
for private gain. Similarly, the Golkar party only allowed local business groups to participate in
developmental budgets or projects if these groups affiliate with the Golkar party (Honna 2006).
Vote buying on a local and national level mainly focused on reelecting the Golkar party, and
political benefits mainly focused on political officials with patron-client relationships with
President Suharto or Golkar (Antlov & Cederroth 1995). Further research should be conducted to
examine the role of money politics and corruption in its influence to the number of political
parties in a Southeast Asian polity.
Another development in Southeast Asian scholarly literature lies on the study of elections
at the local level (Kimura 1997; Nelson 1998). The emerging interest on local-level elections is a
welcome development that will further the knowledge and understanding of voter behavior in the
region. The developing interest in examining elections at the local level will only increase as
decentralization begins to separate national and local politics in many Southeast Asian states, for
example, Indonesia’s decentralized system of national and local level politics. Great examples of
local level studies can be found in Kimura’s study of electoral politics in the city of Lipa,
Philippines and Nelson’s and Arghiros’ work on local politics and elections in Thailand
(Arghiros 1995; Kimura 1997; Nelson 1998). Studies of local elections will increase as
decentralization in many Southeast Asian countries will create differences between national and
local politics as the dynamics of politics will vary between the national levels versus the local
levels.
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Similar to the literature on local politics, the literature on party systems and political
parties is increasing and developing. During the 1950s and 1960s, scholarly literature emerged
that focused on trying to understand the formations and development of political parties within
newly independent states. At that time, scholars using Southeast Asia as studies contributed to
the growing literature on political parties as Indonesia experts examined the relationship between
political parties and religious, social, and cultural cleavages known as aliran (Lev1967; Liddle
1970). Other Southeast Asian scholars, such as Lande (1968), focused on the role of patronclient relationships found in political parties of the Philippines. These studies were useful as it
eventually applied to other comparative contexts and studies. Moreover, the growing literature
on Southeast Asian political parties aims to shed light on the origins, formation, and relationship
political parties have with the state and society. Ground-breaking work by scholars such as
Lande (1968) and Teehankee (2002) on the Philippines party system sets the foundation for
future scholars to continue the work.
Although there has been previous scholarly literature that discusses the development and
nature of the electoral systems and political parties of Southeast Asia, this paper attempts to
continue and build upon the work of previous scholars by examining whether electoral systems
influence the outcome of political parties in Southeast Asia. Predicting the outcome of political
parties helps with understanding the potential electoral behavior that will unfold during an
election. Since many democracies in Southeast Asia were established after the 1960s, many of
the democratic institutions such as electoral systems and party systems are fairly new.
Southeast Asian scholars and the research that has been conducted are important
contributions to the debates about parties and elections in consolidating democracies (i.e. semi-
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democracies, demi-democracies, and hybrid democracies, etc.). Studies that have been conducted
in Southeast Asian countries have concluded that the presence of regular elections and the
development of political parties does not inevitably lead to a transition of democracy (Anderson
1988; Case 2002; Chai-Anan 1995; Chai-Anan & Chotiya 1998; Emmerson 1999; Gomez &
Jomo 1998; Liddle 1992; Neher & Marlay 1995; Zakaria 1989). Questions then arise to what
purpose do elections and political parties have in Southeast Asian polities if they do not play a
vital role in the consolidation and quality of democracy. Case studies in Malaysia and Singapore
examine the emergence of the single party dominance, and its success in winning in elections
and resilience over time (Slater 2003). Indeed these case studies of the single party dominance
within two different Southeast Asian countries further highlights the need for a cross-sectional
study to uncover what can explain this phenomena. As scholars continue to examine and study
the polities of the region, it is clear that there is a need for further discussion and understanding
in regards to the mechanisms of Southeast Asian politics. Based on the previous literature and
studies, Southeast Asia polities differ from each other and from other party systems in other
regions. The region of Southeast Asia offers a new batch of understudied cases. Investigating
the origins, development, and significance of these different polities will result in possible
empirical and theoretical insights.

CHAPTER 3
ELECTORAL LAWS

Indonesia

Electoral and Political Party System

Indonesia’s electoral system is a “List Proportional Representation” (List PR). This
electoral system is described as a system in which each party or organization presents a list of
candidates for a multi-member electoral district. Voters vote for a particular party, and the
parties would receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. Under a “closed list”
system, the winning candidate(s) are acquired from the lists in order of their position on the lists.
On the other hand, if the system is an “open list” structure, the voters can have an impact on the
order of the candidates by marking and indicating individual preferences.
Political parties during the Suharto era were considered to be weak and merely an
instrument for insuring the continuation of President Suharto’s authoritarian rule. However, at
the fall of the Suharto regime, political parties began to play an essential role in the current
system. Political parties in Indonesia have been important actors in the fundamental design of
Indonesian contemporary politics: from elections to constitutional change, to the interaction
between the President and parliament. As much as political parties can be essential for
Indonesia’s electoral and party systems, they can also become a weak institutionalized system
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that can be associated with a lack of governmental effectiveness and accountability, such as a
lack of accountability and responsiveness to the constituency and electorate.
Although Indonesian political parties arose mostly from historic cleavages and depend on
the stability of the particular population group for support, this factor does not make the political
parties themselves strong. Oftentimes, it is the early attachments and connections of the political
elite that demonstrates their strength over the political party system and intensifies the tension
within the Indonesian political system.
Indonesia’s political party history can be divided into four party systems: 1) the first party
system evolved from Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945 until democracy was over
overthrown in 1959 by Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” 2) the second party system period
existed under Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” 3) the third period can be observed during
Suharto’s “New Order”; and the fourth party system existed after Suharto’s fall in 1998 to the
present.
The first party system period was from 1945-1958. During the early years of Indonesia’s
independence the system was constantly changing throughout the period due to new
considerations, new constitutions, new election laws, and conflicts and rebellions. The rise of
political parties during this period can be seen as an increase of competition amongst parties as
political parties multiplied–and the Indonesian government adapted to the parties’ alignments in
parliament.
The second party system period was from 1959-1969. President Sukarno’s “Guided
Democracy” overthrew the rise of multiple political parties. The party system during this time

24

was simplified and the number of political parties was reduced or prohibited (for example, the
Muslim Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party); while other political parties had more
advantage during this period, such as the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). During this period,
the forced decline of inter-party competition contributed to the rise of a powerful trio: the
President Sukarno, the military, and the Indonesian Communist Party. This period began the first
iteration of the decline of political parties.
The third party system period begins during President Suharto’s “New Order” regime.
Similar to the second period, this period can also be observed as a contributing factor for the
reduction of political parties in the governmental system as political parties became marginalized
and authority was reoriented on President Suharto, the military, and the bureaucracy. The
political parties were further reduced to the point where eventually there were only two blocs
that emerged. One bloc represented nationalism and minority parties, and the other party bloc
representing Islam. The primary political party, Golkar, was an agglomeration of apolitical
groups (groups of women, youth, and veterans) that captured on average more than 50% of the
vote in all six New Order elections. One of the most important observations during this period is
the fact that the nominal opposition was kept weak and were not given any chance to assume
power under the Suharto regime.
The fourth party system begins after the fall of Suharto’s regime 1998. This current
system is a multi-party system with hundreds of political parties established since 1998. During
this period, President Habibie promised the beginning of elections, after which political parties
began to form in earnest. The political parties that were formed during the Reformation
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(“Reformasi”) Era are the focus for Indonesia’s case study. The formation of political parties
during this period is a reflection of the changing political environment and electoral system in
Indonesia and this is the period of political party system that will be examined for the case study
on Indonesia. Since 1998, forty-eight political parties have been formed, each competing to gain
political power within the newly formed House of Representative and Regional Representative
Council (see Table 1).
Table 1
Indonesia Electoral System
Political System
Constitutional Democracy
National
Bicameral Legislature*
Legislature
The 560-member House of Representatives (DPR)
The 132-member Regional Representatives Assembly (DPD),
consisting of 4 representatives from each of the 33 provinces of
Indonesia
The highest constitutional body, the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR), which consists of the DPR and the DPD sitting together, is
required to meet once every 5 years.
Electoral System
List Proportional Representation (List PR)
Political Party System
Multi-party system
Election Years: Parliamentary 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
(1998–present)
Political Parties
Golkar (leading party of the Suharto era)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)
National Awakening Party (PKB)
United Development Party (PPP)
National Mandate Party (PAN)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Democrat Party (PD)
*Indonesia was formerly a unicameral legislature consisting of only the House of Representatives during the 1998 and
2004 elections. After constitutional reforms in 2004, a bicameral legislature (House of Representatives and Regional
Representatives Assembly) was formed and enacted for the 2009 elections.
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From Table 1, we can view the descriptive status of Indonesia’s electoral type as the List
Proportional Representation system has allowed various political parties to be established. The
List Proportional Representation results in a multi-party system, and we can view from Table 2
the results of the ENPP from a List Proportional Representation system. We can also view the
relationship between the electoral system and the results of the the effective number of political
parties (See Table 2).

Table 2
Effective Number of Political Parties Each Election Year (Indonesia)

Election Year:
House of Representatives
1999
2004
2009
*Please refer to Appendix A

Electoral System
Proportional System-Party List
Proportional System-Party List
Proportional System-Party List

Effective Number
of Political Parties
4.64
7.05
6.20

The electoral system of Indonesia, a Proportional System (PR)/ Party List System does
correlate with the effective number of political parties, the results of ENPP showcases a multiparty outcome. PR systems tries to reduce the disparity between the party’s share of the national
vote and its share of seats, for example, if the major party wins 40% of the votes, it should also
correspond to win roughly 40% of the seats in parliament. Theoretically, this system encourages
all parties to participate during electoral elections. Moreover, this electoral system supports the
use of party lists. These are lists of political parties from which to choose from and that are
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given to voters during national and local elections. PR system allows the voters to choose
between political parties, individual candidates, or both.
The results of the ENPP calculations reflect the outcomes of PR systems. There is a high
ENPP because it correlates with the PR system, which is the number of votes for a political party
will be proportionate to the number of seats. In Indonesia’s case, there are 462 seats in the
Indonesian House of Representatives, and each political party that received votes are
proportionately given the seats that they have won. The current data that is used does correlate
with the PR system. In Indonesia’s case, we can suggest that the electoral system of PR does
predict the outcome of effective political parties. In the case for Indonesia, the electoral laws are
determined to have a low effect on the ENPP because the system has been established to
inevitably yield a multi-party outcome. The electoral laws are permissive in allowing multiparties to be established.

Malaysia

Electoral System and Political Party System

Currently the Malaysian electoral system can be categorized as being First Past the Post
(FPTP). This electoral system is the simplest form of plurality/majority: the winning candidate(s)
is the one who gains more votes than any other candidate(s), even if this is not an absolute
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majority of valid votes. This electoral system uses single-member districts, which allows voters
to vote for political candidates instead of political parties.
Although there are many political parties in Malaysian politics, the most significant
political party coalition since the independence of Malaysia is the Barisan Nasional (BN). The
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) forms the foundation of the coalition. By
agreement and convention, the President and Deputy President of UMNO are Prime Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister respectively.
The electoral system of Malaysia lends itself to be a multi-party system since the first
direct election of the Federal Legislative Council of Malaya in 1955. Although the political party
system is considered to be a multi-party system, there is no denying that the political party
coalition UMNO has always held power in the government and dominated the electoral system
since Malaysian independence and continued to gain control of the parliament once an alliance
with fourteen other political parties was formed to establish the political coalition of BN. Out of
the political parties that comprises the BN, two of the political parties are the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), both former members of the
Alliance Party coalition, which was a predecessor of the BN (See Table 3).
This system is the simplest form of plurality/majority system, using single member
districts and candidate-centered voting. The voter is presented with the names of the nominated
candidates and votes by only choosing one candidate. The winning candidate is simply the
person who wins the most votes. This particular system gives rise to a strong single-party
government and party coalitions. In Malaysia’s case, we can observe that this is the case. When
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examining the data, we can see that the Barisan Nasional party is the strongest political party
coalition comprising of different political groups. From the table above, the ENPP value of 5.43
is the result of applying the ENPP formula in the 2008 elections when the Barisan Nasional is
broken up into their smaller political parties. If we compare the ENPP of 5.43 to Appendix B we
can see that when we break up the party coalitions, there are roughly five political parties that are
given the parliamentary seats. The advantage of this system allows other political parties that
might not have a chance in the electoral elections, have a chance. For example, in Malaysia’s
case, the Barisan Nasional government is made up of a broadly-based overarching structure
which includes Malay, Chinese, and Indian candidates in areas of various ethnic complexions.
A disadvantage against this system is that it allows for the phenomenon of ‘regional
fiefdoms,’ where one party wins all the seats in a province or area—which is true in Malaysia’s
case. The number of members is based on the number of constituencies in Malaysia. This system
will unfortunately exclude minorities in that particular area that is represented by the winning
party. Another advantage is that this system encourages the development of political parties
based on ethnicity, which can be witnessed in Malaysia’s case.
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Table 3

Malaysian Electoral System

Political System
National
Legislature

Electoral System
Political Party
System
Election Years:
Parliamentary
(1959–present)
Political Parties

Federal Constitutional Monarchy
Bicameral Parliament
In the 70-member Senate (Dewan Negara), 44 members are
appointed by the paramount ruler to serve 3-year terms and 26
members are appointed by the state legislatures to serve 3-year terms.
In the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) 222 members are
elected by popular vote to serve 5-year terms**
First Past the Post (FPTP)—Plurality
Multi-party system
1959, 1964, 1969,1974*, 1978, 1982, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008,
2013
Barisan Nasional ruling coalition:
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)
10 other minor partners
Opposition:
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR)
Democratic Action Party (DAP)
Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)
PKR, DAP and PAS have formed a loose coalition - the Pakatan
Rakyat - since the March 2008 general elections

*Although general elections in Malaysia began in 1959, for the purpose of this study, analysis of effective number
of political parties will begin from 1974-2008.
**Seats in the House of Representatives vary during each election, for example, during the 2004 general election;
there were 219 seats at stake for the House of Representatives. After the 2009 elections, the House of
Representatives comprised of 222 members.

Proceeding to Malaysia’s case, we can observe a different phenomenon. In Malaysia’s
case, the electoral system is a Majority System that applies The First-Past-The-Post system (See
Table 4).
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Table 4

Effective Number of Political Parties Each Election Year (Malaysia)

Election Year: House of
Representatives
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1995
1999
2004
2008

Electoral System
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote
Majority System-Direct
majority vote

Effective Number of
Political Parties*
1.29
1.36
1.35
1.39
1.92
1.39
1.64
1.21
1.87

*Effective number of political parties rounded to the nearest hundredth.
*Please refer to Appendix B

Overall, in Malaysia’s case, the electoral system does provide a predictable outcome of
political parties, such as the coalition of Barisan Nasional dominating the electoral elections. In
the case for Malaysia, the electoral laws are determined to have a high effect on the ENPP
because the system has been established to prevent a multi-party outcome. The high effect of the
electoral laws are non-permissive in allowing multi-parties to be established. The electoral laws
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of The First-Past-The-Post system results in the dominant political party to win the majority of
votes.

Philippines

Electoral and Political Party System

The Philippine electoral system can be described as a Parallel System, which is a mixed
system that allows votes expressed by the voters to be used to elect representatives through two
different systems–one List PR system and one plurality/majority system. However, it is
important to note that no account is taken of the seats allocated under the first system in
calculating the results in the second system. This system is applied to the Philippines because of
its bicameral structure in the government which is the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives applies the List-PR, or party-list system, whereas the Senate
members are elected through a majority block-vote. For the purpose of this paper, elections of
the House of Representatives will be observed.
The Philippine party system is authorized by an article in the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, and the Party-List Law. Through the Party-List Law and the
Constitution, marginalized sectors and groups are given a chance to have a political voice in the
government and comprise up to 20% of the House of Representatives which allows citizens to
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participate in the policy making process.1 The party-list system created by the Party-List Law
aims to increase the representation of marginalized and underrepresented groups and create a
more efficient government by focusing on transparency and accountability. Within a party-list
system, proportional representation will be obtained as voters choose among political parties
rather than candidates. Within this system, votes are given to parties in proportion to the votes
they receive. However, at the same time, the Party-List Law in the Philippines also restricts party
representation because of vague definitions or restrictions. For example, in spite of the votes
attained by a political party, the three-representatives-per-party limit rule will result in
misrepresentation of political support; and the 2% threshold for access to seats results in
incentives for competing parties.2
Despite the opportunity for underrepresented and marginalized groups to be represented
in the government, the Philippine political parties are essentially non-ideological vehicles for the
personal gain and political ambition of the political elites. Previous research on political parties
in the Philippines argues that political parties and political control are usually dominated by
political elites. Although Philippine’s political parties lack a coherent national, political, or social
platform, each political party remains dominated by political elites will try to appeal to all
regions, ethnic groups, and social classes in order to gain a majority of support and votes. Patronclient relationships within political parties are a deeper issue that will not be addressed in this

1

Paraline Database on National Parliaments, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed 05 June
2015)
2
Paraline Database on National Parliaments, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed 05 June
2015)
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paper. There is no enforcement of discipline within political parties, which leads to many
politicians switching capriciously back and forth from different parties (See Table 5).

Table 5
Philippines Electoral System

Political System

National Legislature

Electoral System
Political Party System
Election Years: Parliamentary (1998–present)
Political Parties

Pluralist democracy modeled on the
United States, with an executive
presidency, a bicameral Congress and
a Supreme Court that can rule on the
constitutionality of government
actions.
Bicameral Legislature
Senate
House of Representatives
Parallel System
Proportional-List System/ Party-List
System
1998, 2001, 2004
Various parties *Please see Appendix
C

To proceed with the research, this paper aims to observe whether the Philippines electoral
system predicts the outcome of effective number of political parties. Applying the quantitative
formula of effective number of political parties will be interesting to observe in the Philippine
case (See Table 6).
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Table 6

Effective Number of Political Parties Each Election Year (Philippines)

Election Year:
House of Representatives
1998

Electoral System
Mixed System-Parallel

Effective Number of
Political Parties
3.37

2001

Mixed System-Parallel

4.24

2004

Mixed System-Parallel

4.03

*Please refer to Appendix C

Proceeding with the Philippines, it applies a Mixed System that is specifically known as a
Parallel System. This system uses both PR and plurality/majority components. Because the
system of the Philippines is a mixed system, disproportionality of Parallel systems usually give
results that is somewhere between pure plurality/majority and pure PR systems. If we observe
the ENPP of the Philippines, we can see that it is not has high as the Proportional System of
Indonesia’s case. However, it is also not as low as the Majority System of Malaysia’s case—the
results of the ENPP in the Philippines case are in between, which correlates with the electoral
system. In the case for the Philippines, the electoral laws are determined to have a medium effect
on the ENPP because the system has yields a relative multi-party outcome. The electoral laws are
permissive in allowing multi-parties to be established, and the ENPP does showcase more than
one dominant political party. In comparison to Indonesia’s ENPP, the Philippines yields a midrange ENPP with an average of 3.88 ENPP for all the election years studied. In comparison to
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Malaysia’s ENPP, the Philippines succeeds in establishing a multi-party system. This study
concludes that the Philippines’ electoral laws yield a medium effect on the ENPP.
Singapore

Electoral and Political Party System

The electoral system of Singapore is considered to be a plurality/majority system under a
Party Block Vote, unlike a First-Pass-The-Post, there are multi-member districts in a Party Block
Vote. Voters have a single vote, and choose between party lists of candidates rather than between
individual candidates. The party which wins most votes takes every seat in the electoral district,
and its entire list of candidates is appropriately elected. Similar to the First-Pass-The-Post
system, there is no requirement for the winner to have an absolute majority of the votes.
In the case for Singapore, similarly to Malaysia’s electoral case study, the electoral laws
are determined to have a high effect on the ENPP because the system has been established to
prevent a multi-party outcome. The high effect of the electoral laws are non-permissive in
allowing multi-parties to be established. The electoral laws of the Party Block Vote results in the
dominant political party to win the majority of votes, because similar to the First-Pass-The-Post
system that Malaysia implements, there is no requirement for the winner to have an absolute
majority of the votes. Therefore the dominant political party has the opportunity to manipulate
the votes and win the majority of the seats. This study concludes that Singapore’s electoral laws
has a high effect on the ENPP.
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Since 1959, multiparty elections have been a defining feature in the Singapore state.
However, despite these elections with multiple parties, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has
established a hegemonic one-party system. Singapore has all principles of political liberalism:
popular representation, popular selection, and political equality, and majority rule (See Table 7).

Table 7

Singapore Electoral System

Political System
National Legislature
Electoral System
Political Party System
Election Years: Parliamentary (1998–present)
Political Parties

Republic, with a parliamentary system
of government
President
Unicameral Parliament
List Proportional Representation (List
PR)
Multi-party system
1991, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2011
People’s Action Party (PAP)
Workers’ Party (WP)
Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
National Solidarity Party (NSP)
Reform Party (RP)

Despite this fact, these concepts do not give us a full understanding of the politics of
Singapore. The PAP has used its political power to control media, intimidate opponents, and
manipulate the electoral institutions for their own advantage (See Table 8).
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Table 8
Effective Number of Political Parties Each Election Year (Singapore)

Election Year:
Parliament
1991
1997
2001
2006
2011

Electoral System
Majority System-Simple
majority vote
Majority System-Simple
majority vote
Majority System-Simple
majority vote
Majority System-Simple
majority vote
Majority System-Simple
majority vote

Effective Number of
Political Parties
1.10
1.05
1.05
1.05
1.15

*Please refer to Appendix D

In the case for Singapore, similarly to Malaysia’s electoral case study, the electoral laws
are determined to have a high effect on the ENPP because the system has been established to
prevent a multi-party outcome. The high effect of the electoral laws are non-permissive in
allowing multi-parties to be established. The electoral laws of the Party Block Vote results in the
dominant political party to win the majority of votes, because similar to the First-Pass-The-Post
system that Malaysia implements, there is no requirement for the winner to have an absolute
majority of the votes. Therefore the dominant political party has the opportunity to manipulate
the votes and win the majority of the seats. This study concludes that Singapore’s electoral laws
has a high effect on the ENPP.
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Thailand

Electoral and Political Party System
Thailand’s electoral system falls under the Mixed Electoral system, specifically applying
a Parallel System in which the votes of the voters are used to elect representatives through two
different systems–a List PR system and a majority system. Thailand’s electoral system is similar
to the Philippines, which also applies a mixed electoral system. Based on the electoral system
and party system, it should be observed that there should be a multi-party system (See Table 9).

Table 9
Thailand Electoral System
Political System
National Legislature

Electoral System
Political Party System
Election Years: Parliamentary (1998–present)
Political Parties

Constitutional Monarchy
Bicameral
Senate
House of Representatives
Mixed Electoral System
Multi-party system
1995, 1996, 2005, 2007, 2011
People’s Action Party (PAP)
Workers’ Party (WP)
Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)
National Solidarity Party (NSP)
Reform Party (RP)

As we proceed to the final table in the chapter, we can observe that so far, the electoral
systems of Southeast Asia does correspond to the outcome of political parties by observing the
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ENPP of each country. In Thailand’s case, it falls under a Mixed System/Parallel that applies a
mixture of List PR system and a majority system during elections. Similar to the Philippines,
both countries apply the mixed system; however, it can be argued that unlike the Philippines, the
results of the ENPP are very different. In the case of the Philippines, we can observe that the
ENPP falls between a majority/plurality system and a PR system. However, in the case of
Thailand, this phenomenon does not occur, instead, the ENPP of Thailand is very low,
suggesting that only one political party is effective and dominates the electoral system. It is
interesting to note that even though both the Philippines and Thailand employs similar electoral
systems, the results from Thailand do not correspond with the electoral system that is in place
(See Table 10).
Table 10
Effective Number of Political Parties Each Election Year (Thailand)
Election Year:
House of Representatives
1995

Electoral System
Mixed System

Effective Number of
Political Parties
1.10

1996

Mixed System

1.05

2005

Mixed System

1.05

2007

Mixed System

1.05

2011

Mixed System

1.15

*Please refer to Appendix E

The quantitative results of Thailand’s ENPP suggest that there is another factor that
might explain this phenomenon. Based from previous works regarding vote buying in Thailand
(Schaffer 2007) we can assume that maybe this is a potential variable that has impacted the
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results of elections in Thailand. If voters are persuaded to cast their vote for a particular
candidate based on the business exchange of one vote equals a certain incentive such as cash,
goods, or services, then it will likely cause a political party to be more dominate in the elections
if that particular party is able to support funds for vote buying. This would make sense in
Thailand’s case, because if we observe in Appendix E, with the exception of the Thai Rak Thai
party winning twice in the 2001 and 2005 election, the winning political party with the most
votes changes each election. Similar to Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand has a similarly ENPP.
However, unlike Malaysia and Singapore, their winning/dominant political party stays consistent
during each election. Thailand on the other hand, showcases different winning political parties
throughout each election. From which, it will be concluded in this paper that Thailand does not
have an electoral system that corresponds with the outcome of political parties and ENPP.
In the case for Thailand, the electoral laws are determined to have a medium effect on the
ENPP because the system has the potential to yield a relative multi-party outcome similar to the
Philippines, however, the ENPP does not correspond to multi-parties. The electoral laws are
permissive in allowing multi-parties to be established, and the ENPP showcase one dominant
political party. In comparison the Philippines which yields a mid-range ENPP with an average of
3.88 ENPP for all the election years studied, Thailand yields an average of 1.08 ENPP for all the
election years studied. Thailand’s ENPP is similar to the one dominant ENPP found in Malaysia
and Singapore, and the study concludes that the electoral laws in Malaysia and Singapore have a
high effect on the ENPP. However, this study concludes that Thailand’s electoral laws result in a
medium effect on the ENPP because the electoral laws have the potential to yield multi-parties
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similar to the Philippines. The fact that the ENPP does not showcase a multi-party suggests that
there might be further variables that influences the ENPP.
The quantitative approach of applying the ENPP formula in Southeast Asian elections
was successful in showcasing the similarities between the electoral system and the political
parties. In four out of the five case studies, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore, the
electoral system can predict the outcome of the political parties (See Table 11).

Table 11
Results of Electoral System and Effective Number of Political Parties (ENPP)

Country
Electoral System
Indonesia
List Proportional Representation
Malaysia
First Past the Post
Philippines
Parallel System
Singapore
Party Block System
Thailand
Mixed Electoral System

Electoral Laws
Effect on ENPP
Low
High
Medium
High
Medium

Average
ENPP
6.20
1.87
4.03
1.05
1.15

Indonesia’s electoral laws implement a List Proportional Representation that results in an
inevitable multi-party system, therefore the effect of the electoral law is low on the ENPP.
Malaysia and Singapore are comparable in regards to showcasing that the effect of electoral laws
are high because the electoral laws implemented prevents the occurrence of multi-parties.
Malaysia enforces a First-Past-the-Post and Singapore implements a Party-Block Vote, both
electoral laws prevent multi-parties to occur and secures a one-party dominance in the
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government. In regards to the Philippines, the electoral laws have a medium effect on the ENPP
as the country implements an electoral system that will yield a mid-range number of political
parties. However, in the case of Thailand, which employs a Mixed/Parallel system, it should
have resulted in an ENPP that is between a Majority/Plurality system and a PR system, similar to
the ENPP found in the Philippines. The result of Thailand’s ENPP might suggest that there is
another variable, such as societal cleavages or patron-client networks that are possibly
influencing the outcome of winning parties. Overall, the quantitative results of this section
suggest that political parties in Southeast Asia, specifically Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Singapore, do reflect the existing electoral system in the particular country. For the case of
Thailand, further research from a qualitative approach might enhance the understanding of
Thailand’s political parties in the electoral system.

CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC CLEAVAGES

Social cleavage is a concept that can be applied towards voting analysis when measuring
the voting behavior of an individual group. Cleavages separate the voters into divisions and
voting blocs based on varying degrees of social class, gender, age, race and religion. The
underlying mechanism for the relationship between societal cleavages and voting behavior is
assumed to be facilitated by social and political attitudes –i.e. the difference in social positions
are linked with different issues that will in turn encourage voters to support for parties that
represent their concerns and interests. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) claim that there are three
associations to the concept of cleavage. First a cleavage involves a social division that separates
people along a social characteristic such as occupation, status, religion, or ethnicity. Second, the
individual groups that make up a cleavage must be conscious of their collective identity. Third, a
cleavage must have an organizational component that will allow for formal institutions to
represent the different social divisions. It is not easy to define what ethnicity is and there is not a
consensus on how to define ethnicity and how ethnic groups are created. Among some scholars,
ethnicity is generally defined as sense of group belonging with common core characteristics of
origin, history, culture, language, experience, and values (Baumann 2004; Bulmer 1996).
Ethnicity and race is different. Racial identity is related to birth-ascribed status based on physical
and cultural characteristics imposed by others. Whereas ethnic groups can define their own
cultural characteristics and the concept of ethnicity is fluid and dynamic over time. The ethnic,
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religious, and linguistic identities will be examined for the five Southeast Asian countries in this
study.
Similar to the concept of societal cleavages, the conceptual theory of cultural
heterogeneity refers to the existence of multiple different cultures in a given population (Alesina
& La Ferrar 2005; Fearon & Laitin 2003). This can include measuring the societal, ethnic, and
religious cultures. Within social science research, fractionalization measures the levels of ethnic,
cultural, linguistic, and religious groups and the results of each country’s ethnic fractionalization
was collected from the data collection from Alesina and La Ferrar (2005). Figure 1 showcases
the theoretical concept of social heterogeneity within the context of the political party system. It
is presented by Clark, Golder, and Golder (2011) that the number of political parties will depend
on the relationship between the degree of social heterogeneity and the degree of permissiveness
in the electoral system. Social heterogeneity is measured by the effective number of ethnic
groups in a country (Clark, Golder, & Golder 2011) (See Figure 1).
Permissive electoral system is the idea that the electoral system is non-restrictive on the
increases of socioeconomic heterogeneity and is dependent on whether a country applies singlemember electoral districts (low permissiveness) or multi-member electoral districts (high
permissiveness) (Clark, Golder, & Golder 2011). Consider the four scenarios shown in Figure 1.
First, high social heterogeneity and a high permissive electoral system is expected to result in the
formation of many parties under a proportional representation. Second, high social heterogeneity
and low permissive electoral system will result in a few parties under a single-member district.
The last two scenarios showcases that low social heterogeneity will result in a few parties even if
the electoral system permissiveness is low or high. The societal cleavages will be examined
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within the context of Table 11 to determine if the social heterogeneity influences the number of
parties.

Source: William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, Sona N Golder, 2011 (p. 658).

Figure 1:

Interplay of Social Heterogeneity & Electoral System and Permissiveness on
Party System Size.

This chapter will examine the ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages and the cultural
fractionalizations that are found in the five Southeast Asian countries. A brief background of
each country’s social, religious, and ethnic heritage will be discussed along with a brief
discussion of each country’s regime type.
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Indonesia

After thirty-one years under the New Order regime, the fall of Suharto’s dictatorship
unleashed long-held ethnic tensions that resulted in the deaths of at least 10,000 people between
1997 and 2002. Indonesia descended into widespread chaos as resentment between different
ethnic, religious, and regional groups boiled over. The various groups clashed and deadly
violence deadly violence escalated. During the May 1998 uprising, about 1,500 people died and
4,000 buildings were damaged, burned, or totally destroyed.1 The catastrophic Asian financial
crisis was one of the catalysis of the uprising that started the morning of May 13th until May 15th,
which also spread throughout Jakarta. Months prior, news coverage observed the growing AntiChinese sentiment surfacing as small riots broke out and destroyed small Chinese-owned stores
in parts of eastern and central Java. During this time, the New York Times covered a story of the
growing Anti-Chinese sentiment and interviewed an ethnic Chinese shop owner, Embing Sutino,
who stated “everything is calm here…clam but tense.”2 The news article continued to describe
Mr. Embing’s measures towards security as he “put new iron grates on his shop fronts, burnished
his relations with local security forces, set up a telephone tree with his Chinese friends and
stopped driving his expensive car so as not to provoke envy.”3 The Anti-Chinese resentment

1

The New York Times, “In Jakarta, Reports of Numerous Rapes of Chinese in Riots,”
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/in-jakarta-reports-of-numerous-rapes-of-chinese-inriots.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 09 September 2015).
2
The New York Times, “Indonesia Turn Its Chinese into Scapegoats,”
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/02/world/indonesia-turns-its-chinese-into-scapegoats.html (accessed 09
September 2015)
3
The New York Times, “Indonesia Turn Its Chinese into Scapegoats,”
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/02/world/indonesia-turns-its-chinese-into-scapegoats.html (accessed 09
September 2015)
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continued to grow during the next months and erupted in May of 1998 as anger and retaliation
towards the ethnic Chinese resulted in targeting Chinese shopkeepers with news reports of the
organized killings and victims “being trapped in burning buildings,”4 and horrific accounts of
systematic rape towards ethnic Chinese women.5 Based on the news coverage and accounts of
the mass systematic killings and torture of the ethnic Chinese, societal cleavages exist in
Indonesia during its early formation towards democracy.
The three most salient societal cleavages in Indonesia are ethnicity, religion, and region.
Although Indonesia’s population is composed of hundreds of ethnic groups the country is almost
entirely Muslim. This ethnic heterogeneity and religious homogeneity create intersecting
cleavages that should theoretically reduce conflict and incentivize multiethnic political parties.
However, the occurrence of ethnic violence after the fall of Suharto demonstrates the social and
political salience of societal cleavages in Indonesia. Despite survey data indicating widespread
allegiance to Indonesian nationalism, subnational identities emerged during this transition period.
As the new democratic political system developed, many expected to see ethnic political parties
emerge in conjunction with the ongoing ethnic violence. Observers of the chaos and ethnic
conflict that unfolded predicted that Indonesia’s democratic transition would portend the
formation of ethnic political parties. However, Indonesia’s political system is dominated by

The New York Times, “ Riots Break Out in Jakarta After Shooting of Students,”
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/14/world/riots-break-out-in-jakarta-after-shooting-of-students.html (accessed 09
September 2015)
5
The New York Times, “In Jakarta, Reports of Numerous Rapes of Chinese in Riots,”
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/in-jakarta-reports-of-numerous-rapes-of-chinese-inriots.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 09 September 2015).
4
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multi-ethnic parties rather than ethnic parties—electoral laws established to be inclusive (See
Figure 2).

Figure 2:

Ethnic Composition of Indonesia

Over one thousand ethnic and subethnic segments make Indonesia one of the most
ethnically diverse countries in the world. The largest ethnic group in Indonesia, the Javanese,
total that constitutes forty percent of the population. The second largest group, the Sundanese,
total almost 31 million and constitute fifteen percent of the population. As we can see from Table
2, the ethnic groups are mostly dispersed across the archipelago. The Javanese, who are a
plurality nationally, only constitute a majority or plurality in four provinces: Central Java,
Yogyakarta, East Java and Lampung. Indonesia’s remaining provinces are a majority or plurality
non-Javanese (a category divided into hundreds of other groups). The regional dispersion of
Indonesia’s largest ethnic group undermines its ability to operate as a cohesive political and
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social unit and the homogeneity of the religious group leads to a potential dominant interest
group for one religion (See Figure 3).

Figure 3:

Religious Composition of Indonesia

From Figure 3, we can see that Indonesia’s largest religious group is composed of
Muslims. With eighty-seven percent of the population Muslim, the religion is a dominant
cleavage in Indonesian society. Christianity is the second largest group following Islam, and is
almost ten percent of the population. The other religions practiced in Indonesia, such as
Buddhism and Hinduism, make up less than three percent of the population. From these figures,
we can see that in comparison to the ethnic cleavage, there is not a significant religious cleavage
in Indonesia since the majority of the population are Muslim (See Table 12).
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Table 12
Cultural Fractionalization of Indonesia

Country

Ethnic

Linguistic

Religious

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

Indonesia

0.735100

0.768000

0.234000

This non-significance of the religious cleavage is again reiterated in Table 12 as we can
see that the religious fractionalization is lower in comparison to the ethnic fractionalization.
Although the religious fractionalization is not significant, we can view from Table 12 that
overall, ethnic fractionalization does exist in Indonesia. Alongside the discussion of societal
cleavages and examining this influencing variable through a quantitative perspective, we can
also explain societal cleavages through an examination of Indonesia’s political regime and its
influence over the ENPP.
Indonesia is described as an electoral democracy. The legacy of 350 years of Dutch
colonization left a political culture in Indonesia similar to the Dutch parliament found in the 19th
century. Indonesia’s political institutions resembles 19th century Dutch parliament as the
founding fathers involved in forming the Indonesian state were educated in the Netherlands and
were exposed to the system of Dutch politics. The Dutch colonial power was also compatible
with the Javanese culture and the Javanese hierarchical societal classes: the king, the aristocracy
class, the middle class, and the commoners. During the Dutch colonization, additional
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hierarchical cleavages were created: the Dutch, the Eurasians, the Chinese and Arabic merchants,
and the lowest layer, the native Indonesians. These ethnic divisions are a legacy that has been
inherited and continues to divide the current Indonesian society and creates a multi-ethnic and
highly ethnic fractionalization. The high ethnic fractionalization has the ability to influence the
outcome of the ENPP.

Malaysia

Similar to Indonesia, Malaysian political systems have transformed unexpectedly since
1998. In Indonesia, at the height of the Asian financial crisis, President Suharto was forced to
leave office, engendering a range of political reforms and the introduction of electoral
democracy. In Malaysia, the removal and arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, previously the powerful
deputy of Prime Minister Mahathir, resulted in several events: the reformation movement, the
establishment of a multiracial pro-democratic party (PKN) and competitive, though still highly
manipulated national elections.
Similar to Indonesia’s anti-Chinese resentment, ethnic separation has been so entrenched
in Malaysia. Government policies of positive discrimination often favor the Malay majority and
the Bumiputera status, particularly in areas such as housing, finance and education. Economic
policies designed to favor Bumiputera, including affirmative action in public education, were
implemented in the 1970s in order to defuse inter-ethnic tensions. However, these policies have
not been fully effective in eradicating poverty among rural Bumiputeras and have further caused
a backlash especially from Chinese and Indian minorities.
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Current events have unfolded in regards to a political crisis. Ethnic-Malay chauvinism
has escalated sharply amid a political crisis which began in July, when a report in the Wall Street
Journal alleged that almost $700 million had entered the prime minister’s bank accounts shortly
before the election. Prime Minister Mr. Najib denies any criminal activity or corrupt practices;
Malaysia’s anti-corruption commission says the money was a legal political donation from
unnamed Middle-Eastern benefactors. A swift cabinet restructuring overthrew dissenters within
UMNO, but elevated pro-Malay conservatives in their place. The party has taken to claiming that
its critics are part of a plot to topple the government, backed by foreign media. Tens of thousands
of ethnic Malays marched on Wednesday September 16th in show for support for the scandalplagued government, stirring up fear of ethnic tensions.1 Many opposition supporters against the
current government come from ethnic Chinese, and relations between the two communities are a
delicate balance of tension since the race riots in 1969, see Figure 4 for the composition of
ethnicities in Malaysia.

1

Channel News Asia, “Pro-Government Malaysian Rally Raises Worry About Ethnic Tension,”
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malay-pride-rally-heigh/2129838.html (accessed 09 September
2015)
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Figure 4:

Ethnic Composition of Malaysia

From Figure 4 above and Figure 5 below, we can see that the ethnic and religious
cleavages varies and that Malaysia is a diverse country. From Figure 4, we can see that
Malaysia’s ethnic composition is relatively divided between the ethnic Malays, which make up
fifty percent, and other ethnicities that make up the other fifty percent. Following behind the
ethnic Malays are the ethnic Chinese, which make up twenty-two percent of the ethnic
population. Similar to Indonesia, Malaysia’s religious composition is largely Muslim with sixtyone percent of the population. The second largest religious group is the Buddhist with nineteen
percent (See Figure 5).
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Figure 5:

Religious Composition of Malaysia

Both major ethnic groups, Malays and Chinese, have their own spheres of control and
power. UMNO, a party and the ruling political party since Malaysia's independence from Britain,
depends on the majority Malay population for votes by using laws that give Malays priority over
other races in areas such as employment and education. Such policies has been implemented in
laws that developed the idea that the ethnic Malays or Bumiputeras should get special privileges
in Malaysia. The Malays dominate in politics at both national and state levels, the civil service,
military and security forces. The Chinese have traditionally dominated in the spheres of economy
and live in large numbers in urban areas of Malaysia.
In Malaysia, deeply rooted societal cleavages and political traditions still exist. A
cleavage between status quo-oriented and reformist parties is evident in Malaysia. The National
Front (a coalition of several ethnic Malaysian political parties such as UMNO, MCA, MIC,
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Gerakan, etc.) is in almost every constituency pitted against the Alternative Front (PAS, PKR,
the successor of PKN, and, until 2001, DAP). Proportional representation systems tend to
strengthen fragmentation and to produce multiparty. In Malaysia, the combination of
parliamentarism with a plurality electoral system in single-member constituencies has fostered
the establishment of two opposing blocs, the National Front and the Alternative Front (Barisan
Nasional and Barisan Alternatif). Direct competition between PAS and UMNO has nurtured
Islam as an instrument and the politicization of religious issues. If Malaysia introduced a
proportional representation system with free and fair elections, PAS would probably become
moderate in Islamic terms as it would have to compete for votes across the country.
Although the results of the ethnic and religious composition of Malaysia indicates that
the country is diverse, let us examine the cultural fractionalization found in Malaysia (See Table
13).

Table 13
Cultural Fractionalization of Malaysia

Country

Ethnic Fractionalization

Linguistic Fractionalization Religious
Fractionalization

Malaysia

0.588000

0.597000

0.665700
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From the distribution of the ethnic and religious groups in Figure 4 and Figure 5, we
should see that the ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization should be relatively
significant because the societal cleavages are spread throughout the country. In Table 13 we see
that the confirmation that the ethnic and religious fractionalization is not as high compared to
Indonesia’s ethnic fractionalization, but the results of the fractionalization is between a midrange that it could be relatively significant. At the very least, the ethnic fractionalization numbers
showcases that societal cleavages do exist in Malaysia. It is established that ethnic cleavages is
relatively significant to influence the ENPP by examining the ethnic composition. We can also
examine the political legacy and regime that was established in Malaysia to find an explanation
on why ethnic cleavages are significant.
Malaysia was colonized by British rule and the legacy from the British colonization has
influenced the institutions and the country’s governance over its multi-ethnic society. Malaysia is
often categorized as a semi-democracy or a multi-party autocracy regime. Though sufficiently
free and fair elections are absent, it would be inaccurate to describe the regime as fully
democratic and authoritarian. Opposition parties have opportunities to voice their grievances;
occasionally they win elections at the state level, but the main dominant political party, the PAP,
still manages to secure a foothold in the government. From the previous chapter on electoral
laws, we can assess that the high level of strong electoral laws prevent the outcome of multiple
ENPP. During British colonial rule, an established strong state apparatus under the control of the
British and local elites were necessary to control the multi-ethnic society that existed and the
potential political threats. Post-colonial Malaysia still exhibits the strong state institution from
British rule as multi-parties and multi-ethnic groups are suppressed in the political system in
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favor of the dominant political party. The background of Malaysia’s strong state and regime
might explain in the conclusion whether societal cleavages influence the ENPP.

Philippines

The Philippines, like many of the third world countries in Southeast Asia, is confronted
with problems related to their ethnic and religious minority populations. As a multi-cultural state,
one of the major problems is how to forge unity and cooperation among the various ethnic
groups in the country. The present-day ethnic issues in the Philippines emerged during various
portions of its history of national development, the emergence of governmental institutions, and
its formation of territories. There are more than seventy ethnic groups throughout the islands.
However only eight of these groups make up more than 82% of the population (See Figure 6).
From Figure 6, the ethnic composition is more diverse in than in comparison to
Indonesia. Although the largest ethnic group is the Tagalog ethnic group, which makes up about
twenty-eight percent of the population, the overall ethnic composition of the Philippines varies.
Based on the 2000 Census of Population and Housing, the so-called ethnic majority is made up
of the Tagalog (28%), Cebuano (23%), Ilocano (9%), Hiligaynon (7%), Bikol (6%), Waray
(3%), Kapampangan (3%), and Pangasinan (1%). All of these eight groups are indigenous to the
Luzon and the Visayas. The remaining 18% of the population consist of the ethnic minorities
who are mainly found in Mindanao, located in the southern part of the Philippines. Since 1997,
these ethnic minorities have been legally referred to as “indigenous people” by the Indigenous
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People Rights Act (IPRA). Adding to the ethnic complexity is the presence of several migrant
populations, such as the Chinese, Indian, Spanish, and American.

Figure 6:

Ethnic Composition of Philippines

The Bangsamoro (Muslim Filipinos) people, one of these minority groups found in
Southern part of the Philippines, have been struggling for their right to self-determination and
independence. Their struggle has taken several forms ranging from parliamentary to armed
struggle with a major demand for regional and political autonomy from the Philippines as a
separate Islamic State. The Aquino government established the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao, a governmental agreement to pacify the potential threat against the state by dividing
the provinces.
Philippine society was relatively homogeneous in 1990, especially considering its
distribution over some 1,000 inhabited islands. Muslims and upland tribal peoples were obvious
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exceptions, but approximately 90 % of the society remained united by a common cultural and
religious background. Among the lowland Christian Filipinos, language was the main point of
internal diversity, but the majority interacted and intermarried regularly across linguistic lines.
Philippine national identity emerged as a blend of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. An
American-style public school system diluted religious, ethnic, and linguistic or regional
differences. Because of a common religious tradition Filipinos were a relatively homogeneous
population, with the important exceptions of the Muslim minority on Mindanao and in Sulu,
Filipinos shared a common set of values emphasizing social acceptance as a primary virtue and a
common world view in which education served as the principal avenue for upward social
mobility. Cleavages in the society were based primarily on religious (in the case of Muslims
versus Christians), sociocultural (in the case of upland tribes versus lowland coastal Filipinos),
and urban-rural differences, rather than ethnic or racial considerations (See Figure 7).
In comparison to Figure 6, which showcased a diverse ethnic composition, Figure 7
showcased that the country’s religious composition is pre-dominantly Christian. Religion holds a
central place in the life of most Filipinos, including Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, Protestants,
and animists. Religious associations are part of the system of kinship ties, patron client bonds,
and other linkages outside the nuclear family.
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Figure 7:

Religious Composition of Philippines

Christianity and Islam have been superimposed on ancient traditions and acculturated.
The unique religious blends that have resulted, when combined with the strong personal faith of
Filipinos, have given rise to numerous and diverse revivalist movements. The religious
composition of the Philippines remains predominantly Catholic. Muslims remained largely in
the south and were less integrated than other religious minorities into the mainstream of
Philippine culture. Although most Chinese were members of Christian churches, a minority of
Chinese worshipped in Daoist or in Buddhist temples.
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In comparison to Indonesia and Malaysia, where the societal cleavages tend to lean
towards ethnic traits, the Philippines’ criterion for ethnic identity is primarily based on linguistic
differences. According to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, there are 186 languages that are
used in the Philippines. Based on Table 14, Linguistic fractionalization is statistical higher than
that of ethnic or religious fractionalizations. Societal cleavages are not too apparent in
Philippines and we can confirm these findings by examining the cultural fractionalization (See
Table 14).
Table 14
Cultural Fractionalization of the Philippines

Country

Philippines

Ethnic

Linguistic

Religious

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

0.238500

0.836000

0.305600

Based on Figure 6 and Figure 7, the Philippines’s ethnic and religious composition
should not be as significant as Indonesia’s or Malaysia’s, because the Philippines’ societal
cleavages are evenly distributed. Therefore, we should not expect to view a significant
fractionalization of the ethnic and religious group in the Philippines. As we can see in Table 14,
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the ethnic and religious fractionalization is not significant, which means that the societal
cleavages in the Philippines should not be as significant in the political realm.
Additionally, when we examine the Philippines colonial legacy, we do not see evidence
of the colonial legacy on the ENPP. Unlike Indonesia and Malaysia, the Philippines was not fully
colonized by America in comparison to the Dutch and British rule. The American dominance
during Philippines history did not leave a strong state legacy similarly found in Indonesia or
Malaysia. The American colonial rule over Philippines did not leave strong ethnic tensions or
cleavages in the Philippines society.

Singapore

In comparison to the other Southeast Asian countries in this study, Singapore has an
established “race-based approach” towards politics and is able to repress ethnic politics. In
contrary to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) “freezing hypothesis”, Singapore’s societal cleavages did
not determine its party system. In fact, for over five decades Singapore has been dominated by
one political party and has one of the lowest electoral volatility in the region (Hicken & Kuhonta
2011). Instead of being plagued by divisive ethnic politics, the ruling People’s Action Party’s
(PAP) government has taken active steps to dismantle the cleavages and embarked on a nationbuilding exercise based on multiracialism for administrative and political purposes (Chua 1994;
Siddique 1990). The concept of multiracialism has become an ideological basis for rationalizing
policies and administrative practices governing race, language, public housing, use of public
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space and funds (Chua 1994). Similar to Malaysia, Singapore is considered to be relatively
diverse in the country’s ethnic composition (See Figure 8).

Figure 8:

Ethnic Composition of Singapore

From Figure 4.1, we can see that the majority ethnic group is the Chinese, which
compose seventy-four percent of the population, and the other ethnic groups making up the other
twenty-five percent of the population. From this figure, we should not see a significant ethnic
fractionalization because the county is dominantly Chinese. In regards to Singapore’s religious
composition, it is considered to be the most diverse religiously in comparison to the other
Southeast Asian countries in the region (See Figure 9).
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Figure 9:

Religious Composition of Singapore

From Figure 9, we can see that Singapore is very diverse in religious composition. In
comparison to the other Southeast Asian countries in this study, Singapore is diverse in its
religious cleavages. We should expect a significant religious fractionalization in Singapore.
Inter-ethnic peace has been established in Singapore yet fears of racial riots resurging and
conflicts with its Muslim neighbors continue to dominate national discussion. Preserving social
cohesion remains central to state survivability while inter-ethnic relations are managed with a
“soft-authoritarian form of corporatist democracy” (Thio 2005). To date, public discussions
regarding race, language or religion are taboo and prohibited by a wide range of legislations. As
the self-declared guardian of the nation’s “fragile” peace, the PAP government actively polices
the boundaries of racial and religious discourse and does not hesitate to prosecute those deemed
to have caused ill-will, hostility or hatred between races or religions. However, the strict
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enforcement of rules also infringe on the civil rights and liberties of Singaporeans (Barr & Low
2005; Rajah 2012; Thio 2002) while ad-hoc constitutional reforms that ostensibly protect ethnic
minority rights often lack ethical or political consistency (Chua 2003), and we can see the results
of the ethnic rules when we examine the ethnic fractionalization (See Table 15).

Table 15
Cultural Fractionalization of Singapore

Country

Singapore

Ethnic

Linguistic

Religious

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

0.385700

0.383500

0.656100

As we can see from Table 15, the measurements for ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
is not significant. This result parallels the research found that the government of Singapore has
taken measures to repress ethnic politics. However, we can view that the religious
fractionalization is significant because it does show the variety of religious groups that is found
in Singapore. Based on these calculations, we should expect to find political parties in Singapore
to the multi-religious political parties. However, Singapore continues to be dominated by one
secular political party.
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Additionally, Singapore is considered to be a multiparty autocracy similar to that found in
Malaysia. Both countries have also been colonized by British rule. We can also apply Malaysia’s
political regime and colonial legacy influencing the current political culture to Singapore’s
current governance. Singapore does not exhibit strong societal cleavages, even though Figure 8
indicates that ethnic diversity does exist. The possible answer to Singapore’s lack of societal
cleavages and ethnic diversity is that the legacy of a strong state from colonial rule has allowed
ethnic multi-parties to be suppressed by the dominant one-party rule.

Thailand

Thailand’s ethnic composition is nearly homogenous as approximately ninety-five
percent are Thai. We can see from Figure 10 that the majority of the Thai population is
homogenously Thai. The ethnic minorities make up less than five percent of the population.
From this figure, we should not see a significant ethnic cleavage (See Figure 10).

Figure 10:

Ethnic Composition of Thailand
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Additionally, we should not see a significant religious fractionalization for Thailand
because we can see that Buddhism dominants the society with ninety-three percent of the
population (See Figure 11).

Figure 11:

Religious Composition of Thailand

Thailand has four regions each with distinct cultures: the north, the northeast, the central
area, and the south. Although Thailand has regional and cultural difference, the country exhibits
a strong national Thai identity. Figure 11 displays the religious homogeneity of the country as
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ninety-three percent of the population follow Buddhism and less than ten percent of the
population follow the Christian and Islam. These figures would indicate that Thailand is should
not have a significant religious cleavage due to the dominance of one particular religion.
This study presents data on the divisions of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. In
Thailand, these cleavages are not the case for political division. Instead, politics in Thailand is
shaped by the divide between two groups: the south urban middle class, military, and traditional
royalist elites, known commonly as the “yellow,” versus the north rural, populous, and
impoverished masses, known commonly as the “red.”
Both yellow and red try to claim the Thai government and both have ulterior motives in
doing so. Although both movements reflect the deep social concerns of the Thai people, both
seek to triumph in competing for traditional Thai hierarchical power relationships.
The main stream of political value in Thailand is related to traditionalism and
conservatism and includes respect of the monarchy and the hierarchical social structure and
maintenance of tradition and culture based concepts from Buddhism.
Allen Hicken (2008) argues that "...current Thai politics is increasingly defined by
conflict between re-invigorated cleavages — specifically, class (wealth and middle classes v.
poor) and region (Bangkok and the South v. the North and Northeast).” However, these
cleavages especially have long existed. Only moderately politicized, cleavage conflicts have
generally remained just under the surface. What has changed in the past decade is not only that
this cleavage has become more politicized, but it has, become divided by parties based on
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patron-client networks. We thus witness poor rural voters becoming partisan in ways they had
not been before.
Thailand has a significant ethnic and linguistic fractionalization in comparison to the
religious fractionalization. However, if we examine Figure 10 and Figure 11, we can see that the
percentage of ethnic Thai and religious Buddhism makes up the majority of the population.
There is a discrepancy, between the figures of Thai’s ethnic and religious cleavages versus the
calculated cultural fractionalization. An alternative answer to this issue is that this particular
country is divided based on “rural” and “urban” cleavages, which is not accounted for in this
calculation. Based on the moderate level of ethnic fractionalization, we should speculate that
there should be multi-parties, however, the result of the ENPP is 1 dominant effective political
party (See Table 16).

Table 16
Cultural Fractionalization of Thailand

Country

Thailand

Ethnic

Linguistic

Religious

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

Fractionalization

0.633800

0.634400

0.099400

Thailand is grouped together with the Philippines when in discussion of the type of
political regime. Thailand is considered to be a minimalist democracy. Unlike its Southeast
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Asian counterparts, Thailand was never colonized and was able to develop its own political
culture outside the influence of other countries. The influence of the royal family and the
traditions of accepting the monarchy as an essential component for Thai society and government
is the main component for ethnic fractionalization or societal cleavages based on ethnicity,
language, or religion. Although societal cleavages do exist based on the results from Table 5.3, if
we take a look at the ethnic composition from Figure 5.1 and the religious composition from
Figure 5.2, we can assess that the there is a homogenous population ethnically and religiously. It
will be concluded that societal cleavages to the extent that it should not influence the ENPP in
Thailand.

CHAPTER 5
CORRUPTION: PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS

Indonesia
The issue of political corruption in Indonesia continues to generate daily headlines in the
Indonesian media and heated discussions from politicians, scholars, and civilians. The
abbreviation of “KKN” is a familiar word to Indonesians. In Bahasa Indonesia the abbreviation
stands for corruption (korupsi), collusion (kolusi), and nepotism (nepotisme), and is often used
by demonstrators against the use of political corruption found in the Indonesian government.
Within a historical framework, the New Order regime (1965-1998) can be used as a
starting point for tracing the development of corruption within the Indonesian government.
During this time period, Suharto utilized the patronage system to elicit loyalty from his
subordinates, many of whom were politicians, military leaders, elites, and even critics. Suharto
offered business and political opportunities to his subordinates in exchange for their loyalty and
support. In a way, Suharto’s administration resembled the traditional patrimonial power of precolonial past as the corruption was centralized within the government. The corruption during the
New Order regime was more a top-down approach. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the political
situation changed drastically as a regional decentralization program was created in 2001 and the
transfer of administrative power and autonomy was taken away from Jakarta to the districts.
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Decentralization shifted not only the administrative power but also the distributional practice of
political corruption to the local governments. The local governments started to produce new local
regulations which made it possible for more political officials and other agencies to request for
financial assistance and incentives. Political corruption at this time began to be widespread (See
Table 17).
Table 17 is the result from the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer that showcases the
public perception and opinion towards corruption. As we can see, the public opinion views
Indonesian political parties to be most likely affected by corruption as the average score is 3.7
out of 5 (extremely corrupt). In addition, we can see that forty-seven percent of the population
views the Parliament as the organization most likely to be affected by corruption. Although the
public’s perception of political parties and political organization indicates that corruption is
endemic in the political culture, the public views that the country is effective in fighting
corruption. Seventy-four percent of the population voted that the government’s action in fighting
corruption has been effective.
The Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi abbreviated
KPK) was established in 2003 as a government agency to monitor, investigate, and prosecute
cases of corruption in Indonesia. The support for this agency has been divided. Supporters of the
KPK state that the establishment of the agency is one step towards a corruption-free Indonesia.
The KPK has been successful in the interrogation and prosecution of political officials and highprofile cases. Critics of the agency claim that the agency focuses more on the investigation and
persecution of the lower-ranked officials and not on tackling the core of corruption, even
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claiming that the agency is itself corrupt. In the past, a number of scandals have emerged with
the KPK to undermine its authority.

Table 17
2009 Global Corruption Barometer – Indonesia

To what extent do you
perceive the following
institutions in this
country to be affected
by corruption?

Political Parties

Parliament

Public officials

Average
Scores

4.0

4.4

3.2

3.7

11%

47%

19%

--

(1: not all corrupt, 5:
extremely corrupt)
Which of these six
sectors/organizations
would you consider to
be the most affected by
corruption?

In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living
in your household paid a bribe in any form?
How would you assess
your current
government’s actions in
the fight against
corruption?

29% of the population voted that they
have paid a bribe.

Ineffective

Neither

Effective

19%

7%

74%
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Transparency International has ranked Indonesia as number 107 out of 175 within its
2014 corruption index and scored the country thirty-four out of one hundred. Although Indonesia
has improved from its past corruption index rankings, for example in 2013 the corruption index
ranked Indonesia as 114, the country is still a long ways until corruption can be eradicated or
prevented.
In regards to this study, the results of Transparency International and the 2009 Global
Corruption Barometer showcases that corruption is endemic in Indonesia’s political culture and
can possibly lead to patron-client networks that will influence political parties.

Malaysia

It is widely held that the level of political corruption is lower in Malaysia in comparison
to other Southeast Asian countries. In comparison to Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines,
Malaysia and Singapore are listed as the least corrupt in the Southeast Asian region.
Within Malaysia, however, there is opposition to that widely held claim that Malaysia is
not tainted by political corruption. Allegations of corrupt practices were voiced from opposing
politicians, such as Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, who claim that corruption can be found throughout all
levels of the Malaysian government.
Efforts to combat corruption began with the enactment of The Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance in 1950, which replaced the anti-corruption laws of the former Federated Malay
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States. After independence, more provisions and amendments were passed, such as The
Preventions of Corruption Act, 1961, and the amendments in 1967 and in 1971. On October 1,
1967, the government incorporated aspects of the anti-corruption efforts such as the
investigation, prosecution, and research of corruption into a governmental agency—the AntiCorruption Agency (ACA). Similar to Indonesia’s KPK, the ACA was designed curb the
political corruption and prosecute officials and citizens part-taking in corrupt practices.
Additionally, both the KPK and the ACA are governmental agencies (See Table 18).
Transparency International ranked Malaysia in 2014 as number fifty out or 175 countries
in its corruption index. Besides Singapore, Malaysia is the second country in this research that
has been ranked as less corrupt in the Southeast Asian region. Mauzy (2002) have noted that the
low level of political corruption in Malaysia is partly attributed to the relatively high national
income of civil servants and possibly by the less disruptive transition from British colonial rule
to independence.
However, Table 18 is the result from the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer that
showcases the public perception and opinion towards corruption. As we can see, the public
opinion views Malaysian political parties to be most likely affected by corruption as the score is
3.9 out of 5 (extremely corrupt). In addition, we can see that forty-two percent of the population
views the political parties as the organization most likely to be affected by corruption. Although
Malaysia has been ranked as the second least corrupt country in this study, sixty-seven percent of
the population view that the country is ineffective in combating corruption.
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Table 18
2009 Global Corruption Barometer – Malaysia

To what extent do you
perceive the following
institutions in this
country to be affected
by corruption?

Political Parties

Parliament

Public officials

Average
Scores

3.9

3.3

3.7

3.4

42%

4%

37%

--

(1: not all corrupt, 5:
extremely corrupt)
Which of these six
sectors/organisations
would you consider to
be the most affected by
corruption?

In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living
in your household paid a bribe in any form?
How would you assess
your current
government’s actions in
the fight against
corruption?

9% of the population voted that they
have paid a bribe.

Ineffective

Neither

Effective

67%

6%

29%

In regards to this study, the results of Transparency International and the 2009 Global
Corruption Barometer showcases that corruption is present in Malaysia political culture contrary
to the accepted belief is one of the least corrupt countries in Southeast Asia. The fact that forty-
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two percent of the Malaysian population viewed the political parties as most likely to be
effective by corruption leads to the general assumption that patron-client networks will influence
political parties.

Philippines
Philippine personal alliance systems are anchored by kinship, and the system of patronclient networks were inherited from the Spanish hacienda system that institutionalized an elite
and peasant cleavage during the Philippines’ colonial period (Caoili 2005). Current political
attitudes to authority and patterns of relationships are powerful legacies from colonial times.
Colonialism encouraged a ‘top-down’ approached that suited the colonial interests and elites at
the expense of the general Filipino public. As a result, many Filipinos have a general cynicism
towards politics and the government due to hierarchical patron-client networks imbedded in the
Philippine political culture and society. The general public perceives the Philippines political
culture as dishonest and fraught with personal ambition and greed from political elitists (Leones
& Moraleda 1998; Sidel 1995). Despite the Philippines being the oldest democratic institution in
the Southeast Asian region and in comparison to the other countries in this study, an attachment
to nepotism, corruption, and patron-client networks are the norm in the political culture. Political
elitists and oligarchic tendencies dominate political parties, legislature, and elections through the
use of economic incentives and military and police enforcement (Neher & Marlay 1995; Simone
& Feraru, 1994). The Philippines’ state is subservient to elite interests and corrupt practices and
is incapable of meeting the interests and demands of the general public.
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Similar to the background and history of patron-client networks found in Indonesia and
Thailand, the Philippines’ concept of utang na loob, which is the idea of repayment, and the
system of compadrazgo, which is the idea mutual kinship, drives the patron-client ideology in
the Philippines political culture (Nehr 1991). These patron-client bonds are endemic in the
society as the patron provides the resources and influence over the client in exchange for the
client’s services and support.
One form of incentives and exchange is vote buying. Similar to Thailand, vote buying is
prevalent in the Philippines. Similar to Thailand and its anti-vote buying electoral law, the
Philippines created an electoral law that prohibits the vote buying and vote-selling.1 Despite the
anti-vote buying and anti-vote-selling electoral law, news coverage from the most recent election
in 2013 indicates that the corrupt practice still exist (See Table 19).
Table 19 is the result from the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer that showcases the
public perception and opinion towards corruption. As we can see, the public opinion views the
Philippines political parties to be most likely affected by corruption as the score is 4.0 out of 5
(extremely corrupt). In addition, we can see that thirty-five percent of the population view public
officials as the organization most likely to be affected by corruption. Although the Philippines is
ranked higher than Indonesia in the 2014 Corruption Index, seventy-seven percent of the
population view that the country is ineffective in combating corruption.

1

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance “Is there a ban on vote-buying,”
http://www.idea.int/political-finance/question.cfm?field=282&region=35 (accessed on 01 July 2015)
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Table 19
2009 Global Corruption Barometer – Philippines

To what extent do you
perceive the following
institutions in this
country to be affected
by corruption?

Political Parties

Parliament

Public officials

Average
Scores

4.0

3.9

4.0

3.4

28%

26%

35%

--

(1: not all corrupt, 5:
extremely corrupt)
Which of these six
sectors/organisations
would you consider to
be the most affected by
corruption?

In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living
in your household paid a bribe in any form?
How would you assess
your current
government’s actions in
the fight against
corruption?

11% of the population voted that they
have paid a bribe.

Ineffective

Neither

Effective

77%

2%

21%

Transparency International has ranked the Philippines number eighty-five in their 2014
Corruption Index and scored the country a thirty-eight out of one hundred. However, the Global
Perception Barometer indicates that corruption in the Philippines is still prevalent and continues
to influence the behavior of voters and the outcome of the effective number of political parties.
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Singapore

Singapore is Southeast Asia’s most prosperous city. Its per capita income of $ 56,286 is
the highest in the Southeast Asian region and in comparison to the other countries in this study.2
Under the British, Singapore became a major trade center and initiated the start of entrepreneurs,
corporate executives, and many small business. The start of formal autonomy in 1955 from
British colonialism allowed the country to hold its first parliamentary election. The People’s
Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew won the majority of seats and has maintained its
dominance in the Singaporean government. The PAP was instrumental in the implementation of
an intensive economic development program that rapidly increased the standard of living and
marked Singapore as a rich country in the region. For a small city state and its rapid economic
development, it was vital of Singapore to control corruption for national survival. Consequently,
the administration established the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 1952.3 This
anti-corruption initiative is an independent law agency and its primary function is to investigate
corruption. The CPIB is the only agency empowered to investigate corrupt practices, and was
given its enforcement powers by from The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA). It is one of the
oldest anti-corruption agencies in the Southeast Asian region. The success of the CPIB’s
investigations relies on fighting corruption across the board. In addition to the establishment of
the CPIB, Singapore has enforced strict anti-corruption laws. These anti-corruption laws are

The World Bank, “GDP per capita,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 01 July
2015
3
Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, “Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrupt_Practices_Investigation_Bureau (accessed 01 July 2015)
2
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effective in the fight against corruption. These measures against corruption has led Singapore to
continuously rank as the least corrupt country in the world. The recent 2014 Transparency
International Corruption Index has ranked Singapore as number seventh out of 175 countries,
and scored eighty-four out of hundred. Transparency International scores on a scale of zero
(highly corrupt) to one hundred (very clean). The country’s rank is based on the perception for
the public sector and also indicates the country’s position in comparison to other countries. One
of the factors of Singapore’s low level of corruption are the major reforms that have been
enacted in May 1995 under the “Public Service in the 21st Century (PS21) to achieve good
governance and efficient and effective public service.4 The reforms have allowed Singapore to
reduce its political corruption (See Table 20).
Table 20 is the result from the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer that showcases
the public perception and opinion towards corruption. As we can see, the overall public opinion
towards the Singapore and corruption is highly positive in comparison to the other countries in
the study. Public opinion on average is 2.2 out of five (extremely corrupt). In addition, we can
see that ninety-six percent of the population view the country as effective in combating
corruption.

International Institute For Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “ Is there a ban on vote buying,”
http://www.idea.int/political-finance/question.cfm?field=282&region=35 (accessed 01 July 2015)
4
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Table 20
2009 Global Corruption Barometer – Singapore

To what extent do you
perceive the following
institutions in this
country to be affected
by corruption?

Political Parties

Parliament

Public officials

Average
Scores

2.1

1.8

2.2

2.2

10%

5%

9%

--

(1: not all corrupt, 5:
extremely corrupt)
Which of these six
sectors/organisations
would you consider to
be the most affected by
corruption?

In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living
in your household paid a bribe in any form?
How would you assess
your current
government’s actions in
the fight against
corruption?

6% of the population voted that they
have paid a bribe.

Ineffective

Neither

Effective

4%

0%

96%

Singapore’s political system is corporatist in nature as the country’s political institutions
are governed by the regime in power. The PAP is Singapore’s dominant political party and has
continuously won elections. The 2015 elections has resulted in the PAP winning eighty-three out
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of eighty-nine seats in the Parliament.5 Although Singapore is ranked as one of the top ten least
corrupt countries in the world, it can be argued that the PAP controls the government. For
Singaporeans, the PAP is the state. The result of the 2015 elections solidifies the PAP as the
dominant political party and secures the legacy of the “father” of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew’s
political connections in Singaporean government. The PAP controls the government, and with
that comes the ability to access the state’s immense resources. Technically, Singapore has a
multiparty system and we can view from Table 4 in Chapter 3 that other political parties exist in
the electoral competition. However, the PAP continues to dominant the electoral competition and
establishes itself in the heart of Singaporean government.
The success of PAP can be attributed to the idea of “Asian Values,” an argument that
Asian society and politics should continue to be structured hierarchically (Caoili 2005). The
concept of "Asian values" is based upon a number of presumptions which have serious
methodological problems. The idea of "Asian values" implies that the social, economic and
political characteristics of certain Asian countries are based upon a shared value system which is
identifiable and distinct, and which transcends national, religious and ideological differences.
Nevertheless, according to Caoili (2005) Singapore’s political culture is understood in the
context of Confucian values that emphasize moral government, harmonious society, and
hierarchic relations. Lee Kuan Yew constantly preached “Asian Values” throughout his years in
power.6 Although Singapore is not considered corrupt and the measurement of patron-client

5

Political Parties in Singapore, Parties in Parliament, http://www.singapore-elections.com/political-parties.html
(accessed 01 July 2015)
6
The Wall Street Journal, “Lee Kuan Yew, the Man Who Remade Asia,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/lee-kuanyew-the-man-who-remade-asia-1427475547 (accessed 05 July 2015)
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networks is difficult to trace in a semi-democratic country, Singapore continues to adhere to a
top-down approach, where the dominant political party PAP controls the resources of the
government.
In regards to Singapore’s patron-client networks, it is not clearly identified at this point
whether there is a high level of corrupt patron-client networks that could influence political
parties. Current studies of Singapore’s corruption from Transparency International would
indicate that the country does not have corrupt patron-client networks. The existing anticorruption enforcement agency and the enacted laws curb the level of corruption in the country.
Singapore offers civil servants a competitive salary and benefits, which will decrease the chances
of corrupt practices and the need for patron-client networks from civil servants.7 The salaries of
Singaporean civil servants are quite high by Asian standards to discourage from engaging in
corrupt activity and repress economic incentive. The assumption is that corruption and corrupt
practices becomes a serious problem in countries where the civil servants are generally paid very
low salaries and when there is an unequal distribution of wealth. Moreover, the dominance of the
PAP in electoral competition trumps over any possible chance for patron-client networks for
opposing political parties.
In regards to Singapore, patron-client networks does not affect the effective number of
political parties because Singapore continues to be ruled by one political party—the PAP.

7

Singapore Government, Public Service Division, http://www.psd.gov.sg/singapore-public-service/careers
(accessed 05 July 2015)

86

Thailand
Transparency International has ranked Thailand as eighty-fifth out of 175 nations in the
2014 Corruption Index, and has scored thirty-eight out of one hundred. Thailand is ranked higher
than Indonesia in regards to corruption. However, scholars such as Chang Noi (2008) offer
research that Thai electoral politics has been influenced by patron-client systems and vote
buying.
In Thailand, patrons are expected to be compassionate, protective, and supportive
towards their clients. In return, the clients are expected to act submissively to the patrons and
complete the tasks assigned to them by the patrons. A traditional Thai value is kreng jai, which is
the idea of not wanting to embarrass another person, and within the patron-client dynamic, the
client often feels obligated to the patron to prevent kreng jai (Neher 2004). In comparison to the
patron-client relationship in Indonesia and the Philippines where there is a relatively strong bond
between the patron and client that is often times difficult to break, Thai’s patron-client
relationship allows the client to easily seek new patrons if the previous patron was too
demanding (Neher 2004). There is little commitment to any particular patronage-client
relationship because both parties will engage with one another so long as political and economic
incentives are gained. The patron-client relationship is pervasive in Thai society and within the
political culture. The patrons compete for high-level positions in the military and the government
as political power and economic opportunities and resources are incentives for patrons to win.
Scholars have concluded that Thai politics are centered on patron-client networks.
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Patron-client networks work in conjunction with vote buying in Thailand’s electoral
process. Vote buying is widespread and encompasses all parties and voters to participate through
“canvassers,” a group of individuals who buy votes and often intimidate voters on Election Day
to vote for a specific candidate. Vote buying practices have been reported since 1963 and include
handing out of goods, cash, and incentives to influence voters before elections. Canvassers often
times are powerful patrons in the community such as village chiefs or successful businessmen
that persuaded by incentives from political candidates.
In return for collecting the votes, the elected candidate will reward the canvassers with
lucrative government contracts and business opportunities or by turning a blind eye to the
supporter’s illegal endeavors. Thailand lacks a strong history of real political accountability to
the general public. Once in office, many politicians are accountable to the money interests of
local village chiefs and canvassers rather than the concerns of the general public. As a result,
political parties do not represent policy or an ideological platform, instead, electoral competition
is focused on personalistic candidates rather than competitive political parties. Voters rarely find
candidates that represent their interests or ideas, and very few Thais understand the function of
elected representatives as the money gained from vote selling is often viewed by many Thais as
one of the few benefits they receive from their elected representatives. Vote buying is illegal in
the Thai electoral law. Article 44 states “No candidate nor any person shall commit any act to
induce electors to cast a ballot for him or her or other candidate or any political party or to
abstain from voting for any candidate or political party by the following means: (1) Providing,
giving, offering, promising to give or preparing to give properties or any other benefits which
can be calculated in money value to any person; (2) Giving, offering or promising to give money,
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properties or any other benefits whether directly or indirectly to the community, association,
foundation, temple, education institution, asylum or any other institution; (3) Advertising for an
election by organizing an entertainment; (4) Treating or promising to treat any person with
meals; (5) Deceiving, forcing, threatening, intimidating, slandering or inducing the
misunderstanding in the popularity of any candidate or political party.”8 Despite the detailed law
that prohibits vote buying , there is little enforcement to prevent the corrupt practice (See Table
21).
Table 21 is the result from the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer that showcases the
public perception and opinion towards corruption. As we can see, the public opinion views the
Thai political parties to be most likely affected by corruption as the score is 4.1 out of 5
(extremely corrupt). In addition, we can see that fifty-four percent of the population view public
officials as the organization most likely to be affected by corruption, and sixty-five percent of the
population view that the country is ineffective in combating corruption.

International Institute For Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “ Is there a ban on vote buying,”
http://www.idea.int/political-finance/question.cfm?field=282&region=35 (accessed 01 July 2015)
8
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Table 21
2009 Global Corruption Barometer – Thailand

To what extent do you
perceive the following
institutions in this
country to be affected
by corruption?

Political Parties

Parliament

Public officials

Average
Scores

4.1

3.1

3.6

3.3

54%

6%

22%

--

(1: not all corrupt, 5:
extremely corrupt)
Which of these six
sectors/organisations
would you consider to
be the most affected by
corruption?

In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living
in your household paid a bribe in any form?
How would you assess
your current
government’s actions in
the fight against
corruption?

11%

Ineffective

Neither

Effective

65%

6%

28%

In regards to corruption and particularly patron-client networks, we can conclude that
corrupt practices such as patron-client networks does influence the potential number of effective
political parties.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This research originally was focused on the investigation of what influencing factors
would affect the effective number of political parties. The aim was to find a generalizable pattern
among the five countries studied: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The
study of the three variables: electoral laws, societal cleavages, and corrupt patron-client
networks, in the five countries were to yield a result that would showcase the influencing factor
over the effective political party.
The disadvantage of this study was the inability to further explore the possible interactive
relationship that one variable might possibly have with one another. For example, further
exploration of a weak versus a strong institution and its connection or interaction with corrupt
patron-client networks might explain the variance between the outcomes of political parties in
Indonesia versus Malaysia. Another disadvantage of this study is the data that was used.
Unfortunately, the data used to determine the results of the variables were based on previous
research from other scholars and data collection from a secondary source (i.e. Transparency
International). There are alternative methods to examine the variables in this study. The electoral
system could have been studied through the measurement of district magnitude in each country.
The societal cleavage could have been discussed through the understanding of a political party’s
formation and membership, for example a thorough study of one of the political party that exist
in the country. Or societal cleavages could have been examined by collecting post-election
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surveys from the voters that will examine the voters’ ethnic, religious, class, and linguistic
tendencies and preferences. The corruption and patron-client network could be alternatively
examined by studying the economic resources being used during an election period. The results
of this study leads to further questions and potential research. Further research should take into
consideration the idea of a possible “threshold” among the variables. For example if we take a
look at Indonesia and Malaysia, both countries with similar results yet different ENPP, the
question arises what threshold do the variables have to overcome in order to result in a multiparty outcome.
The result of the research concludes that there are significant patterns when we compare
the findings. Three findings have emerged from the study: 1) the strength of electoral laws can
undermine the influence of societal cleavages and patron-client networks on the ENPP; 2) the
colonial legacy, political regime, and identity politics have the potential to become alternative
variables to explain the variance of ENPP and 3) Singapore is an outlier in comparison to the
other countries. The summary of findings are compiled to examine possible generalizable
patterns (See Table 22).
As an overview from Table 22, we can see the results of the variables and compare them
to the effective number of political parties. Electoral laws as a variable can be found in all five of
the countries within a varying degree of strength (low to high), yet the result of the ENPP differs.
Societal cleavages still exist in Southeast Asia, for example in Indonesia and Malaysia, yet the
ENPP result varies. Corruption in the form of patron-client networks does exit in Southeast Asia
and is present in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, yet it does not explain why
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Indonesia has a higher ENPP in comparison to Malaysia and Thailand with an ENPP of 1. If we
continue to examine across the board for Indonesia and compare it to Malaysia, we see that all
three variables are present in the countries, yet the ENPP for both of these countries differ
greatly: Indonesia has a higher ENPP whereas Malaysia is dominated by one single political
party. Similarly, if we compare the Philippines versus Thailand, both countries having two out of
the three variables present, yet we can still see that the ENPP is different. The Philippines has a
higher ENPP in comparison to Thailand.

Table 22
Electoral Laws, Societal Cleavages and Patron Client Networks on the ENPP

Country
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

Electoral Laws
Low
High
Medium
High
Medium

Societal
Cleavages
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Corruption and Patron
Client Networks
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Effective
Number of
Political
Parties (ENPP)
6.20
1.87
4.03
1.05
1.15

The first finding is the discussion that the strength of the electoral law can undermine the
influence of societal cleavages and patron-client networks in regards to the ENPP. The
comparison between Indonesia and Malaysia is an example of this finding. Both countries
exhibit the existence of societal cleavages and patron-client networks, the only difference is the
level of influence of the electoral laws. Indonesia displays a low level of influence of electoral
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laws in comparison to Malaysia’s high level of influence of electoral laws. The establishment of
certain electoral laws can prevent multi-parties to exist even if the established electoral system of
that country should yield a multi-party. The ENPP of Indonesia exhibits a multi-party outcome
because the influence of electoral laws were low and were permissive to allow for the multiethnic cleavages and patron-client practices to influence the ENPP. In contrast, Malaysia’s
electoral influence was high due to the First-Past-the-Post electoral law that prevented multiparties to occur. Even though the findings for societal cleavages in Malaysia resulted in the
conclusion that there is ethnic fractionalization and societal cleavages do exist, the strength and
influence of the electoral laws prevented the possibility of multi-ethnic political parties. The
same argument can be found in the case study for Singapore as the country’s Party Block Vote
significantly prevents multi-ethnic political parties to exist. In comparison to Indonesia, both
Malaysia and Singapore exhibit electoral laws that are highly influential in determining the
outcome of political parties even if there is a possibility of other variables influencing the ENPP.
The strength of the electoral law continues to result in a one-party dominant system in Malaysia
and Singapore.
The second finding discusses the potential alternative variables that can influence the
ENPP. This study focused its attention to the influencing factor of electoral laws, societal
cleavages, and patron-client networks. During the research three other potential variables
emerged that can potentially explain variance of ENPP found in Southeast Asia. The colonial
legacy, political regime, and the relationship of identity politics are three alternative variables
that can be in interwoven in this study’s narrative. Four out of the five countries in this study
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines) have been colonized in the past and the
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legacy of the colonial rule has contributed to each country’s political regime. If we take a look at
Table 7 we can see that the Philippines and Thailand yield similar results, both countries are
marked with medium level of influence of the electoral laws and both countries have societal
cleavages and patron-client networks that exist. However, the ENPP for the Philippines is higher
and displays a multi-party system in comparison to Thailand. Thailand displays a one-party
dominant system. If we examine the political regime and the colonial legacy of each country we
can further understand the difference between these two countries. The Philippines was
colonized by the United States, and the institutions that were established allowed for multiparties to exist. Thailand in comparison was not colonized by an outside country and maintained
its traditional concept of monarchy and state, therefore the party system continues to be
dominated by the monarchy or the military elites. Additionally, the alternative discussion of
identity politics in political parties can explain the trends of societal cleavages found in
Indonesian political parties. Allowing alternative variables will enhance our understanding of
variance of ENPP in Southeast Asia.
Lastly, the third finding concludes that Singapore is an outlier in comparison to the other
countries in this study. Singapore is a comparative match to Malaysia’s high level of influence of
the electoral laws on the ENPP since both countries demonstrate a strong state and political
institution. However, that is the only pattern Singapore exhibits. Singapore did not demonstrate
significant societal cleavages or the effects of patron-client networks on the ENPP. Even though
we concluded that the high level of strength of the electoral laws in Malaysia will prevent the
possibility of multi-parties, Malaysia at least exhibited the possibility of societal cleavages
influencing the ENPP. The results for Singapore display that the only possible factor in
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influencing the ENPP is the electoral laws. Additionally, Singapore’s results in the ENPP for
each election year exhibits one dominant political party. Singapore is one Southeast Asia country
that should be further examined when a potential opposing political party wins over the dominant
political party and the repercussions that the change will affect. Further research on Singapore’s
dominant political party’s interaction with the electoral laws will be an interesting study because
it can answer the question whether the electoral laws affect the dominance of a political party, or
will the influence and pressure of a dominant political party have the potential to change an
electoral law in favor for that single political party’s interests.
Southeast Asia is not an easy region for academic research because of the region’s
relatively new exposure to democracy and the countries emergence with democratic
consolidation. However, academics agree that in a democracy, the political parties does play an
important role in consolidating democracy. This research concludes that political parties can play
an important role in Southeast Asian countries’ consolidation of democracy and depending on
the relationship of the electoral laws, societal cleavages, and patron-client networks, a number of
variables can influence the formation of the party system and the effective number of political
party.
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EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN INDONESIA
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Party Name
1999 House of Representatives Election
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle )PDI-P)
Golkar Party
National Awakening Party (PKB)
National Mandate Party (PAN)
Justice and Unity Party (PKP)
Crescent Star Party (PBB)
United Development Party (PPP)
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)
People's Rule Party (PDR)
Other Parties

seats

154
120
51
35
6
2
39
3
2
50

totseats propseats propseatssq

462
462
462
462
462
462
462
462
462
462

1999 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2004 House of Representatives Election
Federation of Functional Groups (Golkar)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)
United Development Party (PPP)
National Awakening Party (PKB)
National Mandate Party (PAN)
Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB)
Democrat Party (PD)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Reform Star Party (PBR)
Prosperous Peace Party (PDS)
Others

0.333333
0.25974
0.11039
0.075758
0.012987
0.004329
0.084416
0.006494
0.004329
0.108225

0.111111111
0.067465003
0.012185866
0.00573921
0.000168663
1.87403E-05
0.007125991
4.21656E-05
1.87403E-05
0.011712674

4.638474

128
109
58
52
52
11
57
45
13
12
13

550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550

0.232727
0.198182
0.105455
0.094545
0.094545
0.02
0.103636
0.081818
0.023636
0.021818
0.023636

0.054161983
0.039276033
0.011120661
0.008938843
0.008938843
0.0004
0.010740496
0.006694215
0.000558678
0.000476033
0.000558678
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Party Name
2009 House of Representatives Election
Democratic Party / Partai Demokrat (PD)
The Party of Functional Groups (Golkar)
Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P)
United Development Party (PPP)
National Awakening Party (PKB)
National Mandate Party (PAN)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)
People's Conscience Party (Partai Hanura)
Others

seats
148
106
94
38
28
46
57
26
17
0

totseats propseats propseatssq
560
560
560
560
560
560
560
560
560
560

2009 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2009 Regional Representative Council Election
Democratic Party / Partai Demokrat (PD)
The Party of Functional Groups (Golkar)
Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P)
United Development Party (PPP)
National Awakening Party (PKB)
National Mandate Party (PAN)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)
People's Conscience Party (Partai Hanura)
Others
2009 Regional Representative Council Election ENPP

0.264286
0.189286
0.167857
0.067857
0.05
0.082143
0.101786
0.046429
0.030357
0

0.069846939
0.035829082
0.02817602
0.004604592
0.0025
0.006747449
0.010360332
0.002155612
0.000921556
0

6.205723

57
128
109
58
63
52
45
0
0
8

128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128
128

0.445313
1
0.851563
0.453125
0.492188
0.40625
0.351563
0
0
0.0625
0.375435

0.198303223
1
0.725158691
0.205322266
0.242248535
0.165039063
0.123596191
0
0
0.00390625
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EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES IN MALAYSIA

109
Party Name
1974 House of Representative Elections
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Sarawak National Party
Social Justice Party
Malaysian Socialist People's Party
KITA
Independent People's Progressive Party
Independents/Others

seats

135
9
9
1
0
0
0
0

totseats propseats propseatssq

154
154
154
154
154
154
154
154

1974 House of Representative Elections ENPP
1978 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Sarawak People's Organization
Other Parties
Independents

131
16
5
1
0
1

154
154
154
154
154
154

1982 House of Representatives Elections ENPP

0.8506494
0.1038961
0.0324675
0.0064935
0
0.0064935

0.723604318
0.0107944
0.001054141
4.21656E-05
0
4.21656E-05

1.3595506

132
9
5
0
0
8

154
154
154
154
154
154

1982 House of Representatives Elections ENPP
1986 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Other Parties
Independents

0.768468544
0.003415416
0.003415416
4.21656E-05
0
0
0
0

1.2897542

1978 House of Representatives Election ENPP
1982 House of Representatives Elections
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Sarawak People's Organization
Other Parties
Independents

0.8766234
0.0584416
0.0584416
0.0064935
0
0
0
0

0.8571429
0.0584416
0.0324675
0
0
0.0519481

0.734693878
0.003415416
0.001054141
0
0
0.0026986

1.3479595

148
24
1
0
4

177
177
177
177
177

0.8361582
0.1355932
0.0056497
0
0.0225989
1.3925857

0.699160522
0.018385521
3.19193E-05
0
0.000510709
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Party Name
1990 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Semangat 46
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Parti Bersatu Sabah
Other Parties /Independents

seats

totseats propseats propseatssq

127
20
8
7
14
4

180
180
180
180
180
180

1990 House of Representatives Election ENPP
1995 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional
Democratic Action Party
Semangat 46
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Parti Bersatu Sabah
Other Parties /Independents

162
9
6
7
8
0

192
0.84375
192 0.046875
192
0.03125
192 0.0364583
192 0.0416667
192
0

Non-partisans/Others
2004 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.711914063
0.002197266
0.000976563
0.00132921
0.001736111
0

1.3924605

147
27
10
5
0
3
0
0
0
0

1999 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2004 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional (Coalition of 13 political parties)
Democratic Action Party (DAP)
Alternative Front (Coalition of Islamic Party of
Malaysia & People's Justice Party)

0.497808642
0.012345679
0.001975309
0.001512346
0.006049383
0.000493827

1.9223923

1995 House of Representatives Election ENPP
1999 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional (National Front)
Islamic Party of Malaysia--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Democratic Action Party (DAP)--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
National Justice Party--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Parti Rakyat Malaysia--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Parti Bersatu Sabah--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
State Reform Party--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Malasyain Democratic Party--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Berjasa--Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)
Parti Angkatan Keadilan Insan Malaysia (AKIM)-Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front)

0.7055556
0.1111111
0.0444444
0.0388889
0.0777778
0.0222222

192 0.765625
192 0.140625
192 0.0520833
192 0.0260417
192
0
192 0.015625
192
0
192
0
192
0
192

0

0.586181641
0.019775391
0.002712674
0.000678168
0
0.000244141
0
0
0
0

1.6404414

198
12

219 0.9041096
219 0.0547945

0.817414149
0.003002439

8
1

219 0.0365297
219 0.0045662

0.001334418
2.08503E-05

1.2168828
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Party Name
2008 House of Representatives Election
Barisan Nasional
People's Front (also known as Pakatan Rakyat, PKR)
Non-partisans/Others

seats

totseats propseats propseatssq

140
82
0

222 0.6306306
222 0.3693694
222
0

2008 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.397694992
0.136433731
0

1.8722079

2008 House of Representatives Election
(Detailed Participating Political Parties)
United Malays National Organization
Malaysian Chinese Assoication
Malaysian Indian Congress
Malaysian People's Movement Party
United Traditional Bumiputera Party
Sarawak United People's Party
Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party
Sarawak People's Party
United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organization
United Sabah People's Party
Sabah Progressive Party
United Sabah People's Party
Liberal Democratic Party
People's Progressive Party
People's Justice Party
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
Democratic Action Party
Non-Partisans/Others

79
15
3
2
14
6
4
6
4
3
2
1
1
0
31
23
28
0

222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222
222

0.3558559
0.0675676
0.0135135
0.009009
0.0630631
0.027027
0.018018
0.027027
0.018018
0.0135135
0.009009
0.0045045
0.0045045
0
0.1396396
0.1036036
0.1261261
0

2008 House of Representatives Election
5.434936

0.12663339
0.004565376
0.000182615
8.11622E-05
0.00397695
0.00073046
0.000324649
0.00073046
0.000324649
0.000182615
8.11622E-05
2.02906E-05
2.02906E-05
0
0.019499229
0.010733707
0.0159078
0
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Party Name
1998 House of Representatives Election
Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
LAKAS- National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD)United Muslim Democratic Party (UMPD)
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
Liberal Party (LP)
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
Independents
Others

seats

totseats propseats propseatssq

110
50
15
14
7
2
19

228 0.4824561 0.23276393
228
228
228
228
228
228

1998 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2001 House of Representatives Election
LAKAS
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
Liberal Party (LP)
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP)
BAYANG
AKYSON
REPORMA (PDR)
ALAYON
Independents
Others

2004 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.04809172
0.00432825
0.00377039
0.0009426
7.6947E-05
0.00694444

3.36793

87
62
20
18
4
3
2
2
2
8
6

228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228

2001 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2004 House of Representatives Election
LAKAS
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
Liberal Party (LP)
Laban ng Demokartikong Pilipino (LDP)
Nationalist Party (MP)
Filipino Workers's Party (PMP)
Kabalikat ng Malazang Pilipino (KAMPI)
Others
Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP)
Coalition of the United Filipino (KNP)
REPROMA (PDR)
AKSYON
Independents

0.2192982
0.0657895
0.0614035
0.0307018
0.0087719
0.0833333

0.3815789
0.2719298
0.0877193
0.0789474
0.0175439
0.0131579
0.0087719
0.0087719
0.0087719
0.0350877
0.0263158

0.14560249
0.07394583
0.00769468
0.00623269
0.00030779
0.00017313
7.6947E-05
7.6947E-05
7.6947E-05
0.00123115
0.00069252

4.2352941

93
54
34
11
5
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1

228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228

0.4078947
0.2368421
0.1491228
0.0482456
0.0219298
0.0131579
0.0131579
0.0087719
0.0087719
0.0087719
0.004386
0.004386
0.004386
4.0297674

0.16637812
0.05609418
0.02223761
0.00232764
0.00048092
0.00017313
0.00017313
7.6947E-05
7.6947E-05
7.6947E-05
1.9237E-05
1.9237E-05
1.9237E-05
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Party Name
1991 Parliament Election
People's Action Party (PAP)
Worker's Party (WP)
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)

totseats propseats

seats

77
1
3

81
1
1
0

82
1
1

82
1
1

2011 Parliament Elections ENPP

84 0.97619048 0.952947846
84 0.01190476 0.000141723
84 0.01190476 0.000141723
1.04906334

2006 Parliament Elections ENPP
2011 Parliament Elections
People's Action Party (PAP)
Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Workers' Party (WPS)

84 0.97619048 0.952947846
84 0.01190476 0.000141723
84 0.01190476 0.000141723
1.04906334

2001 Parliament Election ENPP
2006 Parliament Elections
People's Action Party (PAP)
Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Workers' Party (WPS)

83 0.97590361 0.952387865
83 0.01204819 0.000145159
83 0.01204819 0.000145159
0
0
83
1.04967241

1997 Parliament Elections ENPP
2001 Parliament Election
People's Action Party (PAP)
Worker's Party (WPS)
Sinapore Democratic Alliance (SDA)

81 0.95061728 0.903673221
81 0.01234568 0.000152416
81 0.03703704 0.001371742
1.10473144

1991 Parliament Election ENPP
1997 Parliament Elections
People's Action Party (PAP)
Workers' Party (WPS)
Singapore People's Party (SPP)
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)

propseatssq

81
6
0

87 0.93103448 0.866825208
87 0.06896552 0.004756243
0
0
87
1.1473397
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Party Name
1995 House of Representatives Election
Chart Thai
Democrat Party (DP)
New Aspiration Party (NAP)
Chart Patthana
Palang Dharma
Social Action Party
Prachakorn Thai
Nam Thai
Seritham
Ekkaparb
Muan Chon

seats

totseats propseats

92
86
57
53
23
22
18
18
11
8
3

391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391

1995 House of Representatives Election ENPP
1996 House of Representatives Election
New Aspiration Party (NAP)
Democrat Party (PD)
Chart Patthana
Chart Thai
Social Action Party
Prachakorn Thai
Ekkaparb
Seritham
Muan Chon
Palang Dharma
Nam Thai
1996 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.2352941
0.2199488
0.1457801
0.1355499
0.0588235
0.056266
0.0460358
0.0460358
0.028133
0.0204604
0.0076726

propseatssq

0.05536332
0.0483775
0.02125182
0.01837377
0.00346021
0.00316586
0.0021193
0.0021193
0.00079147
0.00041863
5.8869E-05

6.4308669

125
123
52
39
20
18
8
4
2
1
1

393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393

0.3180662
0.3129771
0.1323155
0.0992366
0.0508906
0.0458015
0.0203562
0.0101781
0.0050891
0.0025445
0.0025445
4.3155439

0.10116608
0.09795466
0.0175074
0.00984791
0.00258985
0.00209778
0.00041438
0.00010359
2.5899E-05
6.4746E-06
6.4746E-06
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Party Name
1995 House of Representatives Election
Chart Thai
Democrat Party (DP)
New Aspiration Party (NAP)
Chart Patthana
Palang Dharma
Social Action Party
Prachakorn Thai
Nam Thai
Seritham
Ekkaparb
Muan Chon

seats

totseats propseats

92
86
57
53
23
22
18
18
11
8
3

391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391
391

1995 House of Representatives Election ENPP
1996 House of Representatives Election
New Aspiration Party (NAP)
Democrat Party (PD)
Chart Patthana
Chart Thai
Social Action Party
Prachakorn Thai
Ekkaparb
Seritham
Muan Chon
Palang Dharma
Nam Thai
1996 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.2352941
0.2199488
0.1457801
0.1355499
0.0588235
0.056266
0.0460358
0.0460358
0.028133
0.0204604
0.0076726

propseatssq

0.05536332
0.0483775
0.02125182
0.01837377
0.00346021
0.00316586
0.0021193
0.0021193
0.00079147
0.00041863
5.8869E-05

6.4308669

125
123
52
39
20
18
8
4
2
1
1

393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393
393

0.3180662
0.3129771
0.1323155
0.0992366
0.0508906
0.0458015
0.0203562
0.0101781
0.0050891
0.0025445
0.0025445
4.3155439

0.10116608
0.09795466
0.0175074
0.00984791
0.00258985
0.00209778
0.00041438
0.00010359
2.5899E-05
6.4746E-06
6.4746E-06
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Party Name
2001 House of Representatives Election
Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
Democratic Party (DP)
Chart Thai
New Aspiration Party (NAP)
Chart Patthana
Liberal Democratic
Party of the people
Social Action
Thai Motherland

seats

totseats propseats
248
128
41
36
29
14
2
1
1

500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500

2001 House of Representatives Election ENPP
2005 House or Representatives Election
Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
Democrat Party (PD/DOP)
Chart Thai
Machachon

2007 House of Representatives Election ENPP

0.246016
0.065536
0.006724
0.005184
0.003364
0.000784
0.000016
0.000004
0.000004

3.0522049

377
96
25
2

500
500
500
500

2005 House or Representatives Election ENPP
2007 House of Representatives Election
People Power Party (PPP)
Democratic Party (DP)
Chartthai Party (CTP)
Puea Pandin Party (PPP)
Matchimathipataya Party (MCM)
Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana Party (RC)
Pracharaj Party (PRP)

0.496
0.256
0.082
0.072
0.058
0.028
0.004
0.002
0.002

propseatssq

0.754
0.192
0.05
0.004

0.568516
0.036864
0.0025
0.000016

1.6450182

233
164
34
24
11
9
5

500
500
500
500
500
500
500

0.466
0.328
0.068
0.048
0.022
0.018
0.01
3.0068315

0.217156
0.107584
0.004624
0.002304
0.000484
0.000324
0.0001

Party Name
2011 House of Representatives Elections
Pheu Thai Party (PP)
Democrat Party (DP)
Bhum Jai Thai (BJT)
Chart Thai Pattana
Chart Pattana Pheu Pandin
Palanchon
Rak Thailand
Matubhum
Rak Santi
Mahachon
New Democrat Party
2011 House of Representatives Elections ENPP

seats

totseats propseats
265
159
34
19
7
7
4
2
1
1
1

500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500

0.53
0.318
0.068
0.038
0.014
0.014
0.008
0.004
0.002
0.002
0.002
2.5734991
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propseatssq

0.2809
0.101124
0.004624
0.001444
0.000196
0.000196
0.000064
0.000016
0.000004
0.000004
0.000004

